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Avoiding Estate Depletion in the Face of
Catastrophic Illness
I. Introduction
An important goal of an individual in planning his estate is
to enjoy his property during life while providing for the disposi-
tion of that property to chosen beneficiaries, during life or at
death, with the least amount of shrinkage.' Traditionally, the
role of the estate planner has been to help the individual realize
this objective, within the bounds of the existing laws, by mini-
mizing the effect of estate, gift, and income taxes.2
Today, two additional functions of the estate planner have
become important. First, as medical advances prolong life expec-
tancies,' there is a greater possibility of extended hospitalization
or long-term institutional care resulting from physical or mental
incapacity.4 One's lifetime accumulations may be depleted by
1. S. KuRTz, FAMILY ESTATE PLANNING 1-4 (1983).
2. Id. at 3-4.
3. The death rate of the elderly has decreased substantially since 1940, resulting in
higher life expectancy. Specifically, the death rate of the population 65 years of age and
older decreased by 26.7% so that in 1978 it was 52.9 deaths per 1000. Fingerhut, Mortal-
ity Among the Elderly, in U.S. DP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PUB. No. 82-1232,
HEALTH - UNITED STATES 1981, at 15 (1981). The life expectancy for white males has
increased from 62.8 years for those born in 1939-1941 to 70.6 years for those born in
1979; it has increased for white females from 67.3 years for those born in 1939-1941 to
78.2 years for those born in 1979. It has increased for black males from 52.3 years for
those born in 1939-1941 to 65.5 years for those born in 1979; it has increased for black
females from 55.5 years for those born in 1939-1941 to 74.2 for those born in 1979. No.
106, Selected Life Table Values: 1939 to 1979, in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1982-83 [hereinafter cited as
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT], at 71 (103d ed. 1982).
4. See Weichert, Health Care Expenditures, in HEALTH - UNITED STATES 1981,
supra note 3, at 83. The proportion of people 65 years of age and over has increased from
about 8% of the population in 1950 to more than 11% in 1980. As people age, they tend
to experience more serious illnesses and more chronic conditions. For example, 86% of
those in nursing homes in 1977 were persons 65 years of age and over. Id. (citing Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics: The National Nursing Home Survey, 1977 Sum-
mary for the United States, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELF., PUs. No. 79-1794
(PUB. HEALTH SERV.), VITAL HEALTH STATISTICS (Series 10-No. 43, 1979)). In addition,
the same age group has a higher rate of hospitalization than younger people, as well as
1
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medical expenses,5 leaving few or no assets for one's intended
beneficiaries. Thus, the estate planner must help the estate own-
er plan for future health care needs. Second, an estate planner
may be called upon to advise a parent on how to provide for his
handicapped child while assuring that his other children will ul-
timately receive a substantial share of his assets.
This Comment focuses on public medical assistance as an
entitlement in New York and the estate planning techniques
available to a middle income person to qualify for such assis-
tance if disabled. Part II discusses the elderly client, the eligibil-
ity requirements under public assistance programs, and the law-
ful measures an individual may take during life to preclude
exhausting his assets in the event of incapacity and extensive
medical bills. Part III addresses trusts for handicapped benefi-
ciaries and discretionary provisions that will not defeat the ben-
eficiary's entitlement to public assistance programs. Part IV con-
cludes that planning for disabilities is an essential aspect of
estate planning. By carefully structuring the finances of elderly
clients, the estate planner can better enable them to qualify for
health care assistance under the Medicaid program" and avoid
extensive estate shrinkage. Similarly, by properly drafting trusts,
the estate planner can assure that disabled beneficiaries also
qualify for Medicaid coverage, thereby maximizing the trust re-
mainder for other beneficiaries.
longer stays in short-term hospitals. In 1979, 269.9 persons 65 years and over per 1000
population were discharged from short-stay hospitals and required 2,916.6 days of care,
compared with 166.3 persons ages 45-64 requiring 1,562.1 days, 108.9 persons ages 17-44
requiring 749.7 days, and 64.4 persons under 17 years requiring 357.7 days. Weichert,
supra, at 83, 168 app.
5. The cost of medical care since 1950 has grown at an average rate of 5.5% annu-
ally, outpacing the overall Consumer Price Index, which has increased at an average an-
nual rate of 4.2%. Weichert, supra note 4, at 83 (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Dep't of Labor: Consumer Price Index), 198 app. Furthermore, health care expenditures
for persons 65 years and over are higher than those for younger persons. The per capita
personal health care expenditure in 1978 for people age 65 years and over was two and
one-half times greater than for people 19-64 years of age, and seven times greater than
for people under the age of 19. As a result, 29% of total health care expenditures are
attributable to the elderly, although they represent only 11% of the population.
Weichert, supra note 4, at 83, 210-11 app.
6. For a discussion of Medicaid, see infra text accompanying notes 24-28.
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II. Planning for the Elderly Client's Incapacity
As the average lifespan increases, more persons are faced
with extended hospitalization or long-term institutional care." In
the absence of adequate private insurance, the cost of such care"
can quickly exhaust one's lifetime savings, end a comfortable re-
tirement, and eliminate the possibility of providing for others
after one's death.
Consequently, lifetime planning is essential to ensure the
fulfillment of one's estate plan and to minimize the serious
financial problems resulting from physical or mental incapaci-
ties. In New York there are various mechanisms for handling as-
set management should an incapacity be so extensive that an
individual cannot manage his9 own affairs. A court may appoint
a conservator to handle the property of an incapacitated person,
the conservatee.10 A friend, relative, or even the disabled person,
7. See supra note 4.
8. Health care costs in the United States in 1980 exceeded $247 billion, averaging
$1067 per person and comprising almost 10% of the gross national product. HEALTH -
UNrrED STATES 1981, supra, note 3, at 2. See also Impact on the Elderly of Proposed
Medicare and Medicaid Cuts: Joint Hearing before the House Select Comm. on Aging
and the Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care of the House Select Comm. on Ag-
ing, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1982) (analysis by Rep. Claude Pepper, Chairman). Ap-
proximately 12% of those benefiting from Medicare also qualify for Medicaid, with
nearly six million persons age 65 and over having incomes under $5000. Although the
median incomes for families headed by persons in this group are only one-half the me-
dian incomes for families headed by persons under 65 years of age, health costs for those
65 years of age and over are approximately 43% for hospital care, 26% for nursing care,
and 23% for physicians' and other practitioners' services. Id. (citing National Center for
Health Statistics). See also supra note 5.
9. Throughout this Comment, use of the male gender shall be deemed to include the
female gender, where appropriate.
10. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.01(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). The supreme
court and, outside of New York City, the county courts are empowered to appoint one or
more conservators of the property of an individual, the conservatee,
who has not been judicially declared incompetent and who by reason of advanced
age, illness, infirmity, mental weakness, alcohol abuse, addiction to drugs, or other
cause, has suffered substantial impairment of his ability to care for his property or
has become unable to provide for himself or others dependent upon him for
support.
Id.
Conservatorship in general refers to court-supervised administration of the property
and sometimes of the person of such a disabled individual. Id. § 77.19 (McKinney 1978).
If one is judicially determined "incompetent to manage himself or his affairs by reason of
age, alcohol abuse, mental illness, or other cause, or is a patient who is unable adequately
to conduct his personal or business affairs," the court will appoint a committee of his
3
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nominating his own conservator, may initiate the proceeding. 1
In addition, a person, while competent, may execute a general
durable power of attorney, 2 empowering another to act in his
place and providing that the power "shall not be affected by the
subsequent disability or incompetence of the principal."' 3 Simi-
larly, a person may create a trust to provide for continuity of
management of his estate in the event of disability. 4
While it is important that an individual arrange for the
management of his assets in the event of disability, it is equally
essential that he make appropriate arrangements to meet the
staggering costs of long-term illness, should that become a real-
ity. Private health insurance, including major medical insurance,
may answer this need for some families.' 5 Others may look to
person or of his property or of both. Id. § 78.01 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). A patient
is defined as one lawfully committed or admitted to any department or correction facility
for the mentally ill or mentally retarded or to any department of a mental hygiene facil-
ity. Id. The New York legislature has indicated a clear preference for the appointment of
a conservator over a committee. Id. § 78.02 (McKinney 1978).
11. An individual, while competent, can nominate a person to serve as a conservator
(id. § 77.03 (McKinney 1978)) or as a committee (id. § 78.05) for himself, with the ap-
pointment to take effect if and when he subsequently becomes disabled.
12. A "power of attorney" is "[lin instrument authorizing another to act as one's
agent or attorney. The agent is attorney in fact and his power is revoked on the death of
the principal by operation of law. Such power may be either general or special." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1055 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
13. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1601 (McKinney 1978). Prior to 1975, when this sec-
tion was enacted, a power of attorney terminated with the disability of the principal. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 (1958).
The durable power of attorney has advantages over the conservatorship. In addition
to being simple and straightforward, it avoids the delays and expenses inherent in the
appointment of a conservator. For the smaller estate, it is also more advantageous than a
trust which is more costly to draft and operate. See Callahan, The Use of a Convertible
Trust in Planning for Disability, 53 N.Y. ST. B.J. 422, 424 (1981), for a discussion of the
durable power of attorney.
14. If an individual has extensive or complex assets, the inter vivos trust is the most
flexible, comprehensive, and cost-efficient protection for the administration of his estate
should he become disabled. See Callahan, supra note 13, at 426-28, for a discussion of
the advantages of a convertible trust. The convertible trust agreement provides that the
trust will become irrevocable upon the disability of the grantor, at which time the gran-
tor's attorney in fact, under a durable power of attorney, will add the balance of the
grantor's assets to the trust. With appropriate provisions, this obviates the need for the
appointment of a conservator. Id. at 426.
15. Group insurance provided through employment-related plans accounts for a
considerable portion of private health insurance. In 1975, employers and labor unions
provided 96% of group health insurance, with premiums for such insurance accounting
for 83% of total health insurance premiums. Taylor, Employment-Related Health In-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/10
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Medicare 6 and Medicaid17 as their only resources. Planning
techniques are available to help the less affluent structure their
estates to enable them to qualify for health care assistance
under the Medicaid program, thereby protecting their estates
against astronomical health care claims.1 8
A. Public Assistance Programs
1. Medicare
Medicare is a federal health insurance program available to
persons sixty-five years of age and over who are eligible for so-
cial security or railroad retirement benefits and, after a two year
waiting period, to persons receiving disability benefits under So-
cial Security.19 Inpatient hospital care services, posthospital
skilled nursing care services, and posthospital home health ser-
vices are covered in part for all such eligible persons without
premium payments.2 Persons not eligible may voluntarily enroll
by paying a monthly premium which is determined annually by
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
surance, in HEALTH - UNITED STATES 1981, supra note 3, at 87 (citing B. MITCHELL & C.
PHELPS, EMPLOYER-PAID GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE COSTS OF MANDATED NA-
TIONAL COVERAGE (1975) (Contract No. R-1509-HEW, Santa Monica, Cal., Rand Corp.)).
Some corporations provide a continuation of group health insurance including major
medical coverage in an employee's retirement package. Unfortunately, some employees,
unaware of this coverage, needlessly incur premium costs by enrolling in the Medicare
plan for supplemental medical insurance benefits. Telephone interview with Marie Por-
car, Coordinator, Senior Citizens Law Project of Westchester Legal Services (Mar. 12,
1984). For a discussion of supplemental medical insurance benefits, see infra notes 21-22
and accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 19-23.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 24-28.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 113-43.
19. Medicare was enacted in 1965 to provide health care services to the elderly. So-
cial Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26, 42, 45 U.S.C.); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.102-.105 (1982). In
1973, Medicare coverage was extended to the permanently disabled and their dependents
and, in 1978, to persons with end-stage renal disease. Social Security Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. II, sec. 201, 86 Stat. 1371, 1371-74 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1395c (1976)); Act of June 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-292, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 315 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1395c (Supp. V 1981)).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 426, 1395c (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 C.F.R. § 405.101 (1982). Such
services are covered under "Part A" of Subchapter XVIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c-1395i-2
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
5
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vices. " Supplemental medical insurance benefits, available to
most persons age sixty-five or over regardless of Social Security
eligibility and to disabled persons under age sixty-five, require
payment of a monthly premium.22 Despite the availability of
Medicare, however, its coverage is limited in scope, dollar
amount, and duration.2 s Thus, an elderly person with no addi-
tional insurance can watch his assets disappear to meet ex-
traordinary health care payments.
2. Medicaid
The Medicaid program was established by Congress in 1965
to provide government financed medical care to the poor.24
States choosing to participate in the program are required to
provide benefits to the "categorically needy": persons receiving
cash payments to cover daily expenses because their income and
other resources are inadequate. 25 States may also cover as cate-
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-2 (1976); 42 C.F.R. § 405.106 (1982). For persons uninsured for
social security or railroad retirement benefits and who are not otherwise eligible for hos-
pital insurance, monthly premiums for the 12 month period commencing Jan. 1, 1984 are
$155. 48 Fed. Reg. 44,913 (1983).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395r (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.201, .202, .205 (1982).
During September of each year the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services determines the premium applicable to the 12 month period commencing Janu-
ary 1 in the succeeding year. Monthly premiums for the 12 month period commencing
Jan. 1, 1984 are $29.20 for persons age 65 and over, and $54.30 for disabled persons
under age 65. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65, 169-
71 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395r); 48 Fed. Reg. 44,914 (1983).
Supplemental medical insurance benefits are covered under "Part B" of Subchapter
XVIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-1395x (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
23. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 405 (1982). Inpatient hospital care covers reasonable
expenses for the first 60 days less a deductible of $356 in 1984 in each benefit period. For
the next 30 days, a daily coinsurance amount of $89 is required in 1984. After 90 days in
a benefit period, a patient may elect to draw upon a 60-day lifetime reserve, with a coin-
surance amount of $178 per day deducted for each reserve day in 1984. Skilled nursing
facility care covers up to 100 days following a hospitalization of at least three days for
those who need continued skilled nursing care or skilled rehabilitation services. A patient
must, however, enter a nursing home within 30 days after hospitalization. For the first 20
days in 1984, a daily coinsurance amount of $44.50 is required. Home health care cover-
age is limited to 100 days under "Part A" and an additional 100 days under "Part B" as
to medically necessary home health visits by nurses, therapists, and other health work-
ers, so long as the services are physician prescribed and the patient is homebound and
requires skilled care. Id.; 48 Fed. Reg. 44,912 (1983).
24. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26, 42, 45 U.S.C.).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 C.F.R. § 435.100 (1982).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/10
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gorically needy, persons who would qualify for cash assistance
were they not residing in a medical institution.26 States partici-
pating in the Medicaid program may, at their option, provide
Medicaid benefits to the "medically needy": aged, blind, or dis-
abled persons with income and resources too large to qualify for
categorical assistance, but insufficient to pay for necessary medi-
cal care. 7 State eligibility requirements for the "medically
needy," however, may not be more restrictive than federal eligi-
bility requirements for recipients of Supplemental Security In-
come (SSI).28
a. SSI and the categorically needy
Included among the "categorically needy" are aged, blind,
or disabled persons, or families and children entitled to either
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or an optional
state cash assistance supplement.2 9 From the inception of SSI in
1972, but prior to 1980, SSI applicants were allowed to transfer
resources which, if retained, would have made them ineligible to
receive cash assistance.30 Such resources could be given away or
sold for less than adequate consideration (fair market value)
without defeating eligibility for SS13 1 or for the medical assis-
The "categorically needy" are those persons whom Congress considers particularly de-
serving of public assistance because of age, family circumstances, or disability. They were
originally included under four programs: Old Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-304, 306
(1976), repealed by Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. III, § 303, 86 Stat. 1484;
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981); Aid to the Blind, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1204, 1206 (1976), repealed by Act of Oct.
30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. III, § 303, 86 Stat.1484; and Aid to the Permanently
and Totally Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (1976), repealed by Act of Oct. 30, 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. III, § 303, 86 Stat. 1484. In 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1976
& Supp. V 1981), replaced three of the above state-administered programs, combining
them into one federally administered adult assistance program, Supplementary Security
Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI), with uniform standards of need. The
fourth progam, AFDC, continued as a cooperative federal-state program to assist needy
children and the parents and relatives with whom they live.
26. 42 C.F.R. § 435.211 (1982).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (Supp. V 1981); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.300-.301 (1982).
28. 42 C.F.R. § 435.401(c)(2) (1982). See infra note 37.
29. See supra note 25.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(b) (1976); 42 C.F.R. § 435.120(b) (1979). In 1980, this section
of the Code was amended to restrict substantially transfers of resources for eligibility
purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(c) (Supp. V 1981).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(b).
7
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tance required to be given to SSI recipients.3 2
b. The medically needy
Among the states participating in the Medicaid program,
several elect an option to pay medical assistance only to those
individuals who would have met the eligibility requirements in
effect on January 1, 1972.11 Some, like New York, fear that indi-
viduals with significant assets, anticipating substantial medical
expenses in long-term care facilities, would transfer assets to a
friend or relative in order to qualify for such benefits. The New
York Social Services Law,"' in effect in 1972 when the SSI pro-
gram was created, addressed this concern. It provided that a vol-
untary transfer of assets, in order to qualify for or maintain eli-
32. 42 C.F.R. § 435.120(b) (1982).
33. This "209(b) option" was added by the Social Security Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 209(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1381 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1396a(f), 1396b(f) (1976)). It permits a state to cover in the Medicaid program less than
all SSI recipients, provided such state does not use requirements more restrictive than
requirements in effect on Jan. 1, 1972. Some state plans in effect in January 1972
"deemed" available to an applicant for Medicaid, a certain amount of income of a parent
or spouse as a financially responsible relative, without requiring proof of actual contribu-
tion. Under the "§ 209(b) option," however, an individual eligible for SSI but whose
income is greater than the state's Medicaid eligibility standard, must be permitted to
"spend down" his excess income by incurring medical expenses. In determining the indi-
vidual's countable income, the state agency must also deduct SSI and any optional state
supplementary benefits received, certain increases in social security benefits and ex-
penses for medical care recognized by the state as deductible. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(f),
1396b(f) (1976).
Among the states exercising their "209(b) option" are: Connecticut, 3 MEDICARE &
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 15,566 (Aug. 1983); Hawaii, id. 15,578 (July 1983); Illinois, id.
1 15,582 (Feb. 1983); Indiana, id. 1 15,584 (Jan. 1984); Minnesota, id. V 15,602 (Oct.
1983); Missouri, id. 115,606 (Nov. 1982); Nebraska, id. 15,610 (Aug. 1982); New Hamp-
shire, id. 15,614 (Feb. 1984); North Carolina, id. 15,622 (Mar. 1983); North Dakota,
id. 15,624 (Oct. 1983); Ohio, id. V 15,626 (Aug. 1983); Oklahoma, id. 15,628 (Oct.
1983); Utah, id. 1 15,646 (Jan. 1983); and Virginia, id. 15,652 (Nov. 1983).
New York exercised the "209(b) option" as a result of Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d
491 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 909 (1981), which invalidated its transfer of
assets rule. Morabito v. Blum, 528 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). New York, however,
decided in 1982 to cover all SSI recipients. 3 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
15,620 (Jan. 1983). Effective Aug. 1, 1982, the state re-entered a contract with the Social
Security Administration providing for coverage for the aged, blind, and disabled using
comparable standards for SSI. N.Y. ST. REG. 17 (Aug. 3, 1983) (codified at N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 18, § 360 (1983)).
34. Law of Apr. 30, 1966, ch. 256, § 3, 1966 N.Y. Laws 275, 281, repealed by Medi-
caid Cost Containment Amendments, ch. 56, 1982 N.Y. Laws 126 [hereinafter cited as
N.Y. Soc. SEEN. LAW § 366(l)(e) (repealed 1982)).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/10
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gibility for Medicaid benefits or to defeat the right of recovery of
medical assistance paid, rendered a "medically needy" person
ineligible for Medicaid benefits."
In 1980, however, a federal court held New York's "transfer
of assets" rule invalid. In Caldwell v. Blum,36 the Second Circuit
found that New York's eligibility standards for the "medically
needy" were inconsistent with federal standards for SSI appli-
cants.3 7 According to the court, states could not impose more
35. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 366(1)(e) (repealed 1982). The pertinent provisions are:
1. Medical assistance shall be given under this title to a person who requires such
assistance and who. . . (e) has not made a voluntary transfer of property (i) for
the purpose of qualifying for such assistance, or (ii) for the purpose of defeating
any current or future right to recovery of medical assistance paid, or for the pur-
pose of qualifying for, continuing eligibility for or increasing need for medical as-
sistance. A transfer of property made within eighteen months [formerly one year]
prior to the date of application shall be presumed to have been made for the pur-
pose specified in subparagraph (i); a transfer of property that would be exempt
from consideration under this title, made within eighteen months [formerly one
year] prior to the date of application without fair and reasonable consideration or
made, without lfrior approval of the social services official, at any time after the
application or determination of eligibility, shall be deemed to have been made for
one or more of the purposes specified in subparagraph (ii) hereof. The social ser-
vices official shall approve such an assignment or transfer if he determines based
on the transfer agreement that the applicant or recipient will receive fair and rea-
sonable consideration for such transfer. Such consideration shall be applied as a
resource available to meet the person's medical needs as it becomes available un-
less all or a part of it subsequently qualifies as exempt property under subdivision
two of this section.
Id.
36. 621 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1980), af'g No. 78-CV-569 (N.D. N.Y. 1979) (unreported
decision), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 909 (1981). See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text
for a discussion of current eligibility requirements.
37. Id. Caldwell was a class action challenge to New York's transfer of assets rule by
aged, blind, and disabled New York residents. These people would have been eligible for
SSI benefits (and therefore Medicaid) but for their income and resources; they were de-
ied Medicaid benefits for the medically needy because they had voluntarily transferred
property prior to application for or while receiving such benefits. The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court which had concluded that New York's "no-transfer rule" for
the medically needy was more restrictive than the voluntary transfer rule for SSI appli-
cants and, therefore, in apparent conflict with the federal law. The Social Security Act
requires that a state choosing to benefit the medically needy make such assistance avail-
able to all persons who would, but for income and resources, be eligible for SSI benefits
"and who have insufficient (as determined in accordance with comparable standards)
income and resources to meet the costs of necessary medical and remedial care and ser-
vices." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (1976). In addition, the accompanying regulations
prohibit a state agency from using "requirements for determining eligibility [for Medi-
caid benefits] for optional coverage groups [e.g., the medically needy] that are.. . (2)
For aged, blind, and disabled individuals, more restrictive than those used under SSI."
9
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stringent eligibility requirements on the medically needy than
on the categorically needy. 8
B. New Legislation and Case Law: An Analysis
1. Social Security Act
In response to a split among the circuits on the validity of
"transfer of assets" rules, 9 Congress amended the Social Secur-
ity Act in 1980 to allow states to deny Medicaid benefits to any
individual, whether categorically needy or medically needy, who
"would not be eligible . . . but for the fact that he disposed of
resources for less than fair market value. '40 The law now con-
tains a presumption that assets transferred for less than full
consideration within twenty-four months of an application for
SSI benefits should be included in the available resources of the
applicant.4 1 The presumption is rebuttable by convincing evi-
dence that the transfer was made solely for a purpose other than
establishing eligibility. 42 Thus, although the law as amended
continues to prevent states from imposing more restrictive eligi-
bility requirements upon the medically needy than upon SSI re-
cipients,43 the SSI eligibility requirements have been tightened
by the addition of a federal transfer of assets provision. Further-
more, the federal law provides that should the uncompensated
value of the transferred assets exceed $12,000, states may delay
42 C.F.R. § 435.401(c) (1982).
38. Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 909
(1981).
39. See Fabula v. Buck, 598 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1979), which reached the same result
regarding Maryland's no-transfer rule as the Second Circuit in Caldwell, and Scarpuzza
v. Blum, 73 A.D.2d 237, 426 N.Y.S.2d 505 (2d Dep't 1980), which similarly found N.Y.
Soc. Ssav. LAW § 366(1)(e) (repealed 1982) in conflict with the Social Security Act and,
therefore, in violation of the supremacy clause. The Ninth Circuit, however, originally
upheld California's similar transfer of assets rule in Dawson v. Myers, 622 F.2d 1304 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted sub. noma. Beltran v. Myers, 449 U.S. 951 (1980). This decision was
ultimately reversed due to a change in the Social Security Act. Beltran v. Myers, 701
F.2d 91 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3115 (1983).
40. Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(b), 94 Stat. 3568
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(j)(1) (Supp. V 1981)).
41. Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(a) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981)).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
43. Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(b), 94 Stat. 3568
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (Supp. V 1981)).
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Medicaid eligibility for a period longer than twenty-four months
provided "the period of ineligibility bear[s] a reasonable rela-
tionship to such uncompensated value. '44
2. New York Social Services Law
a. Medicaid eligibility
To assure that public resources are available to help only
the intended beneficiaries of the Medicaid program, the econom-
ically disadvantaged, the New York legislature has attempted to
limit the cost of the program.45 In April 1982, New York Social
Services Law section 366 was amended in accordance with the
federal law to revise state procedures for determining Medicaid
eligibility.4"
Section 366 establishes the eligibility standards for medical
assistance to SSI recipients, AFDC recipients, the "medically
needy," and others. To preserve public assistance for the genu-
inely needy, all resources available to the applicant are consid-
ered. These intlude the applicant's resources,47 those of his par-
ents or spouse,48 assets transferred to meet Medicaid eligibility
requirements, 49 and those the applicant could have, but never
actually possessed.50 A limited amount of income and certain re-
sources are exempt.5'
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(j)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
45. See Memorandum of State Executive Department, 1982 N.Y. Laws 2429; Gover-
nor's Approval Memorandum, 1982 N.Y. Laws 2590 (in support of Medicaid Cost Con-
tainment Amendments, ch. 56, 1982 N.Y. Laws 126 (codified as amended at N.Y. Soc.
Stmy. LAW § 366(5) (McKinney 1983))).
46. Medicaid Cost Containment Amendments, ch. 56, 1982 N.Y. Laws 126 (codified
as amended at N.Y. Soc. Sanv. LAw § 366(5) (McKinney 1983)).
47. N.Y. Soc. Stag. LAw § 366(2)(b) (McKinney 1983).
48. Id. See also 42 C.F.R. § 435.602 (1982). The resources of other members of the
applicant's household, however, are not considered available for his support.
49. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 366(5)(a) (McKinney 1983). See infra notes 52-76 and
accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
51. N.Y. Soc. SFav. LAW § 366(2)(a) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1983-1984). The stat-
ute provides:
The following income and resources shall be exempt and shall neither be taken
into consideration nor required to be applied toward the payment or part pay-
ment of the cost of medical care and services available under this title:
(1) a homestead which is essential and appropriate to the needs of the
household;
11
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(i) Availability of transferred assets
In amending section 366, the legislature specifically sought
to end assistance to persons transferring assets to meet Medi-
caid eligibility requirements. In determining the initial or con-
tinuing eligibility of any person, "the amount of resources con-
sidered available to such person [includes] the uncompensated
value of any nonexempt resource transferred within twenty-four
months prior to the application for medical assistance. 5 2 The
"uncompensated value" is the fair market value of the resource
at the time of transfer, less the amount of compensation re-
ceived in exchange.5 3 "Nonexempt resource" covers any resource
which, if retained by the applicant, would not be exempt.5 4 In
addition, there is a rebuttable presumption that a transfer of a
nonexempt resource made within twenty-four months before the
date of the person's application was made for the purpose of
(2) essential personal property;
(3) liquid resources in the amount of five hundred dollars for each person, but
not in excess of two thousand dollars per family, as a burial reserve;
(4) savings in amount equal to at least one-half of the appropriate income
exemptions allowed;
(5) income taxes;
(6) health insurance premiums;
(7) payments for support of dependents required to be made pursuant to
court order; and
(S) income in an amount set forth in schedule:
Annual net income - Number of family members in a household and family
members for whom they are legally responsible or have assumed responsibility.
One Two Three Four Five Six Seven
$4,500 $6,600 $6,700 $6,800 $6,900 $7,000 $7,400
Such income exemptions shall be increased by seven hundred dollars for each
member of a family household in excess of seven.
(9) subject to subparagraph eight, the department upon the application of a
local social services district, after passage of a resolution by the local legislative
body authorizing such application, may adjust the income exemption based upon
variations between cost of shelter in urban areas and rural areas in accordance
with standards prescribed by the United States secretary of health, education and
welfare.
(10) for the personal expenses of a resident of a residential health care facil-
ity as defined by section twenty-eight hundred one of the public health law, the
amount of forty dollars per month.
Id.
52. N.Y. Soc. Suav. LAW § 366(5)(a) (McKinney 1983). See infra note 71.
53. N.Y. Soc. SmV. LAW § 366(5)(b)(3). See infra note 71.
54. N.Y. Soc. Sznv. LAW § 366(5)(b)(1). See infra note 71.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/10
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qualifying for such assistance."
If, as a result of this presumption, an applicant is deter-
mined to have excess resources of $12,000 or less, such applicant
shall remain ineligible for assistance for twenty-four months
from the date of transfer.5 If excess resources exceed $12,000,
an applicant shall remain ineligible for twenty-four months plus
one additional month for each $2000 in excess of $12,000.51 In
either case, the period may be shortened if the applicant can
show medical expenses incurred after the date of transfer in ex-
cess of the otherwise allowable resources."
The most significant exempt resource is a "homestead which
is essential and appropriate to the needs of the household." 9
55. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(5)(b)(2). See infra note 71. It is important to note,
however, that a transfer more than 24 months before the person's application for medical
assistance does not necessarily mean he is "home free." The Department and courts may
still look to intent. If any fraud is involved, medical assistance will still be denied. See
infra notes 56-65, 75-76, 142-49 and accompanying text. Note also, however, that since
the presumption under § 366(5)(b)(2) only covers transfers made within 24 months
before a person's application, the burden after that period presumably switches to the
Department, which must prove intent by substantial evidence.
56. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(5)(c)(1). See infra note 71. For example, if a woman
with limited assets were to transfer gratuitously to her son a $10,000 bond on Jan. 1,
1983, enter a nursing home six months later, and apply for Medicaid benefits on Sept. 1,
1983, the $10,000 would be included in determing the value of her nonexempt resources.
If her total nonexempt resources were $12,000 or less, she would remain ineligible for
medical assistance until Jan. 1, 1985 (24 months from the date of the transfer) or until
such sooner time that her incurred medical expenses exceed such excess resources
($12,000 or less). It appears from the text of the statute that this would apply even if the
transferee exhausted the assets. If the assets were so exhausted, they would not actually
be available although according to the statute, they would still be deemed available. N.Y.
Soc. SERv. LAW § 366(5)(c)(1). The applicant would, of course, have the right to rebut.
Note also that there should be a different result, however, should the transferee exhaust
the assets for the transferor.
57. N.Y. Soc. S.Rv. LAW § 366(5)(c)(2). See infra note 71. Given the example in
note 56, supra, but changing the amount transferred and her total nonexempt resources
from $10,000 to $50,000, the woman would be ineligible for medical assistance until Aug.
1, 1987 (24 months from date of transfer plus one month for each $2000 in excess of
$12,000) or until such time as her medical expenses exceed $50,000, whichever is sooner.
Note that the applicant must show that medical expenses were incurred. They need not
necessarily have been paid.
58. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(5)(c)(1), (2).
59. Id. § 366(2)(a)(1). See infra note 71. See also N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, §
360.23(b) (1983) (defining "homestead" as "the home and land owned and occupied by
an applicant") (emphasis added). N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5206(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-
1984) exempts from application to the satisfaction of a judgment, unless recovered fully
for the purchase price thereof,
13
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Under prior law, once property was transferred or sold the state
considered it no longer essential to the transferor.60 Accordingly,
the state maintained that such transferred property, whether
originally exempt or nonexempt, was to be considered a resource
to the transferor in determining his eligibility for Medicaid
benefits."
In Sherman v. Sanfilippo, 2 for example, the appellate divi-
sion upheld a denial of medical assistance to an eighty-two year
old widow, who shortly after being admitted to a nursing home,
transferred her house to her son and daughter-in-law, allegedly
to qualify for medical assistance and to defeat claims for Medi-
caid reimbursement.' The court concluded that Mrs. Sherman's
[p]roperty of one of the following types, not exceeding ten thousand dollars in
value above liens and encumbrances, owned and occupied as a principal residence
1. a lot of land with a dwelling thereon,
2. shares of stock in a cooperative apartment corporation,
3. units of a condominium apartment, or
4. a mobile home.
Id. Thus, a house used only as a vacation or weekend retreat does not qualify as a home-
stead. In re Estate of Galcia, 59 Misc. 2d 511, 299 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1969).
60. See Memorandum of State Dep't of Soc. Serv., 1977 N.Y. Laws 2422 (statement
in support of Act of Aug. 5, 1977, ch. 755, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1224 (N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §
366(1)(e) (repealed 1982))).
61. See Memorandum of State Dep't of Soc. Serv., 1977 N.Y. Laws 2422 (statement
in support of Act of Aug. 5, 1977, ch. 755, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1224 (codified at N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 366(1)(e) (repealed 1982))). See also Mondello v. D'Elia, 39 N.Y.2d 978, 355
N.E.2d 286, 387 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1976), where the court of appeals found that, due to a gap
in N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 366(1)(e) (repealed 1982) (see supra note 35 for text of re-
pealed statute), the transfer of exempt property could not disqualify one from eligibility
for medical assistance. The court reasoned that the owner of exempt property is not
disqualified from receiving medical assistance because of such ownership. If one transfers
property without consideration, it loses its exempt status. Therefore, since the transfer of
nonexempt property renders one ineligible to receive assistance, one would not transfer
exempt property to enable one to qualify for assistance. To cure the gap noted in
Mondello, § 366(1)(e) was amended to render ineligible for medical assistance those who
made voluntary transfers of property not only "for the purpose of qualifying for such
assistance, [but also] for the purpose of defeating any current or future right to recovery
of medical assistance paid, or for the purpose of qualifying for, continuing eligibility for
or increasing need for medical assistance." Act of Aug. 5, 1977, ch. 755, 1977 N.Y. Laws
1224 (codified at N.Y. Soc. SeRv. LAW § 366(1)(e) (repealed 1982)).
62. 74 A.D.2d 675, 424 N.Y.S.2d 540 (3d Dep't 1980).
63. Id. at 675, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 541. See also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(1)(e) (re-
pealed 1982). See supra note 61.
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house was no longer an exempt homestead once transferred."
The nonessential nature of the property was evidenced, the
court reasoned, by the fact that due to Mrs. Sherman's advanced
age and poor health, it was unlikely that she would ever return
to her house. 5
When a homestead is sold, rather than transferred without
consideration, there is no question as to whether the house is
still a homestead of the transferor. The conversion into cash
proceeds removes the exemption for determining eligibility for
medical assistance,66 unless, of course, the proceeds are used to
purchase another homestead. The proceeds, until depleted, con-
stitute an available resource. 7
Section 366(1)(e) of the New York Social Services Law68 de-
nied or terminated medical assistance to persons who within
eighteen months of applying for such assistance had voluntarily
transferred any property to qualify or continue eligibility for
such medical assistance or to defeat the right to recovery of
medical assistance paid. This section was repealed in 1982, '9
when a new subdivision 5 was added.70 The new subdivision
looks to available resources in determining initial or continued
64. Sherman v. Sanfilippo, 74 A.D.2d at 676, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
65. Id. at 676, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 541. But see Kruk v. Blum, 76 A.D.2d 882, 428
N.Y.S.2d 719 (2d Dep't 1980) (where the court held that a transfer of a residence by an
applicant to her children a few weeks prior to her experiencing a disability did not pre-
clude her from eligibility for medical assistance); Troll v. Toia, 68 A.D.2d 927, 414
N.Y.S.2d 371 (2d Dep't 1979) (where evidence was insufficient to support findings that
an applicant confined to a nursing home indefinitely would not return to her house, and
that her house having been transferred without consideration was no longer her home-
stead, the court held that the house remained her homestead and was, therefore,
exempt).
66. See McManus v. D'Elia, 66 A.D.2d 783, 410 N.Y.S.2d 655 (2d Dep't 1978). Mrs.
McManus appointed her daughters as attorneys in fact and in that capacity the daugh-
ters transferred their mother's house to themselves, individually, and then sold the
house. Because the daughters were acting as their mother's attorneys in fact, the court
deemed the sale to be made by Mrs. McManus.
67. Id. Cf. Moran v. Lascaris, 61 A.D.2d 405, 402 N.Y.S.2d 486 (4th Dep't 1978)
(where son sold his mother's house to a third party, cash proceeds, until depleted, would
have been available resources for determining eligibility; the court refused to terminate
mother's benefits, however, because there was insufficient evidence that she was aware of
the sale and, therefore, it was questionable whether she had knowingly and willfully
made a voluntary transfer).
68. N.Y. Soc. Saav. LAW § 366(1)(e) (repealed 1982).
69. Medicaid Cost Containment Amendments, ch. 56, 1982 N.Y. Laws 126.
70. Id. (codified as amended at N.Y. Soc. SFRv. LAW § 366(5) (McKinney 1983)).
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eligibility for medical assistance.7 1 Available resources include
"the uncompensated value of any nonexempt resource trans-
ferred within twenty-four months prior to the date of applica-
tion for medical assistance. 7 2 Although there is still a presump-
tion that a transfer made within the stated period was made to
qualify for medical assistance,7  the new subdivision applies only
71. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 366(5). The statute provides:
(a) In determining the initial or continuing eligibility of any person for assis-
tance under this title, there shall be included in the amount of resources consid-
ered available to such person the uncompensated value of any nonexempt resource
transferred within twenty-four months prior to the date of application for medical
assistance.
(b) For purposes of this subdivision:
(1) a nonexempt resource shall mean any resource which if retained by such
person would not be exempt from consideration under the provisions of subdivi-
sion two of this section;
(2) any transfer of a nonexempt resource made within twenty-four months
prior to the date of a person's application for medical assistance shall be pre-
sumed to have been made for the purpose of qualifying for such assistance; how-
ever, if such person furnishes evidence to establish that the transfer was exclu-
sively for some other purpose, the uncompensated value shall not be considered
available to such person in determining his or her initial or continued eligibility
for medical assistance;
(3) the uncompensated value of any such resource shall be the fair market
value of such resource at the time of transfer, minus the amount of the compensa-
tion received by the person in exchange for the resource.
(c)(1) Any person determined to have excess resources of twelve thousand
dollars or less because of the application of this subdivision shall remain ineligible
for assistance under this title for a period of twenty-four months from the date of
the transfer, or until such person can demonstrate that he or she has incurred
medical expenses after the date of transfer in the amount of such excess above
otherwise allowable resources, whichever period is shorter.
(2) Any person determined to have excess resources of more than twelve
thousand dollars because of the application of this subdivision shall remain ineli-
gible for assistance under this title for a period which exceeds twenty-four
months, which period shall be determined by adding an additional month of ineli-
gibility for each two thousand dollars in excess of twelve thousand dollars, or until
such person can demonstrate that he or she has incurred medical expenses after
the date of transfer in the amount of such excess above otherwise allowable re-
sources, whichever period is shorter.
(d) The commissioner shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this subdivision.
(e) The provisions of this subdivision shall not be applicable to any transfer
made prior to April tenth, nineteen hundred eighty-two.
Id.
72. Id. § 366(5)(a).
73. Id. § 366(5)(b)(2). See also New v. New York State Bd. of Social Welfare, 49
N.Y.2d 857, 404 N.E.2d 1333, 427 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1980), where the statutory presumption
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to resources which if retained would not be exempt.7 4 It would
appear, therefore, that the transfer of a homestead or any other
property exempt in the hands of the transferor will no longer
disqualify the transferor from eligibility for medical assistance.
One must note, however, that Sherman was not decided on the
basis of the statutory presumption, since Mrs. Sherman trans-
ferred her house more than one year (the prohibited period at
the time) prior to her application for medical assistance.7 6 De-
spite the fact that the statutory presumption was not applicable,
the court placed the burden on the applicant to disprove the ad-
verse inferences regarding the transfer. e
(ii) Other available assets
Not only resources transferred by the applicant but re-
sources he never actually possessed may be considered available
resources.77 For example, a widow's elective share of her hus-
band's estate has been held to be a resource available to her
even where she did not exercise her right of election and, there-
fore, never possessed the elective share.78 This result is justified,
the court in Flynn v. Bates79 reasoned, because "'the word
'needy' does not in its ordinary meaning encompass a person
who is creating the need by consistently avoiding or refusing to
under N.Y. Soc. Sanv. LAw § 366(1)(e) (repealed 1982) was brought into play with evi-
dence showing a transfer of all bank accounts to the applicant's son within two months
of the application for medical assistance. The form of the accounts, the fact that appli-
cant had received funds in her own right over the years and had commingled them with
her son's, and lack of proof regarding her living expenses helped support denial of her
application. But see Radano v. Blum, 89 A.D.2d 858, 453 N.Y.S.2d 38 (2d Dep't 1982),
where the statutory presumption was rebutted with credible, plausible, uncontradicted
testimony of the applicant and her daughter that all the money in a joint account be-
longed to the daughter who was using the account solely for convenience with no inten-
tion to confer a present beneficial interest on her mother.
74. N.Y. Soc. SaRv. LAw § 366(5)(b)(1) (McKinney 1983). See supra note 71.
75. Sherman v. Sanfilippo, 74 A.D.2d at 676, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
76. Id. Since Mrs. Sherman did not transfer her house (one of her few assets) until
40 days after she was admitted to a nursing home, and at a time when it was highly
unlikely that she would ever return to her house, the court determined that she had the
burden to disprove the adverse inference that the transfer was made for medical eligibil-
ity purposes.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 78-90.
78. Flynn v. Bates, 67 A.D.2d 975, 413 N.Y.S.2d 446 (2d Dep't 1979).
79. Id.
19841
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
provide for his needs.' "SO
Similarly, the New York County Supreme Court deemed a
renounced inheritance an available resource,81 despite the fact
that it is well established in New York that a distributee may
renounce an inheritance "even if the renunciation has the effect
[or objective] of frustrating creditors."8 In In re Estate of
Scrivani,s8 Marie Scrivani died intestate, leaving her sister, Mrs.
Molinelli, as her sole distributee. If not renounced, the entire
estate would have been immediately subject to the claims of
Mrs. Molinelli's creditors, primarily a nursing home. 4 Mrs.
Molinelli's granddaughter, as her conservator, sought permission
to renounce the inheritance on her grandmother's behalf. 85
In denying permission, the court considered In re Estate of
Schiffmanas where an administrator was permitted to renouce
an inheritance on behalf of an intestate decedent even though
the renunciation was for the express purpose of defeating a
claim for Medicaid recovery. In that case, the fact that one-half
of the assets renounced would pass to the administrator individ-
ually was not sufficient reason to set the renunciation aside.87
The Scrivani court reasoned, however, that an inheritance is "an
inchoate property interest, which clearly has value and is availa-
ble to the beneficiary [as] an 'available resource' for Medicaid
80. Id. at 977, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 448 (quoting Barie v. Lavine, 48 A.D.2d 36, 38, 367
N.Y.S.2d 587, 590 (3d Dep't 1975)).
81. In re Estate of Scrivani, 116 Misc. 2d 204, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1982).
82. Id. at 208, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 509 (citing In re Estate of Schiffman, 105 Misc. 2d
1025, 430 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1980); In re Estate of Deitch, 106 Misc. 2d
690, 435 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1981)). A renunciation is made retroac-
tive to the date of the decedent's death and must be treated as if no inheritance or gift
ever passed to or vested in the renouncing person. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-
1.11(d) (McKinney 1981). Furthermore, subject to court authorization, a guardian of an
infant, a committee of an incompetent, a conservator of a conservatee, or a personal
representative of a decedent may renounce on behalf of his ward. Id. § 2-1.11(c).
83. 116 Misc. 2d at 205, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 204, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 507. The proceeding was one in which the conserva-
tor was seeking permission of the Supreme Court of New York County to renounce an
inheritance on behalf of the conservatee. Under N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2.1-
11(c), a conservator desiring to make such a renunciation must obtain authorization to
do so from the court having jurisdiction of the conservatee.
86. 105 Misc. 2d 1025, 430 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
87. Id. at 1027-28, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 230-31.
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[eligibility] purposes.""8 On the basis of the new section 366(5)
of the Social Services Law and other eligibility requirements of
the statute, the court reasoned that a distributee would effec-
tively be denied Medicaid benefits until he incurred medical ex-
penses exceeding the value of the inheritance, whether or not he
were to renounce. 9 While there was no assurance that if renun-
ciation were allowed, the family members benefiting would take
care of Mrs. Molinelli's future needs, the court's denial of the
renunciation guaranteed that her personal needs would be met
until the inheritance was exhausted, at which time Mrs.
Molinelli would be eligible for Medicaid.90
b. Medicaid recoupment
Once an applicant meets the eligibility requirements under
section 366(5),11 Medicaid will cover most medical expenses."
88. In re Estate of Scrivani, 116 Misc. 2d at 209, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 510. The court
acknowledged that a renunciation is retroactive to the decedent's date of death. The gift
never vests in the beneficiary who renounces, because he is deemed to have predeceased
the decedent for inheritance purposes. Id. at 208, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 509. Therefore, al-
though technically there cannot be a "transfer of specific property in which the benefi-
ciary holds title, [renunciation] is [a] transfer of a resource." Id. at 209, 455 N.Y.S.2d at
510. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Note that New York State law clearly prohibits renunciation of property already
accepted by the renouncing party. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 2-1.11(0 (McKin-
ney 1981). Section 2518 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (I.R.C. § 2518(b) (West
1983)) and the proposed Treasury Regulations § 25.2518-1 set forth the rules for a "qual-
ified disclaimer [which] is an irrevocable and unqualified refusal to accept the ownership
of an interest in property." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-1, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,921, 48,925
(1983). For estate planning purposes, one meeting the requirements for a qualified dis-
claimer can be assured that the disclaimed property will not be included in his estate for
federal estate tax purposes. Prop. Tress. Reg. § 25.2518-1(b). Thus, the property, if al-
lowed to be disclaimed on behalf of Mrs. Molinelli (Mrs. Scrivani's beneficiary), would
not at death be included in Mrs. Molinelli's estate for estate tax purposes, even though it
would be considered during her lifetime as an available resource for Medicaid eligibility
purposes.
Because the amount here is nominal, however, there would be no federal estate tax
even if it were included in her estate for federal estate tax purposes. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010
(West 1983).
89. In re Estate of Scrivani, 116 Misc. 2d at 209, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
90. Id. at 211, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 511. The court also pointed to the possible conflict of
interest of the conservator, Mrs. Molinelli's granddaughter. Id. at 210, 455 N.Y.S.2d at
510. She had a fiduciary duty to function as the court's agent in her jurisdiction over her
grandmother, the conservatee. She also had potential self-interest as an indirect distribu-
tee through her mother. Id. at 210-11, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 510-11.
91. N.Y. Soc. SRv. LAW § 366(5) (McKinney 1983).
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Upon the applicant's death, however, the Department of Social
Services may be able to recover amounts previously expended on
an "implied contract" theory."3 Thus, assuming an applicant's
exempt property had not affected his eligibility for medical as-
sistance, such property in the recipient's estate at death might
be subject to recoupment by the Department of Social Services
to the extent of the cost of assistance or care received.9 " If so,
plans to transfer the homestead or other exempt property at
death may be defeated. As a result, individuals anticipating ex-
tensive medical costs have effected such transfers during life, so
that at death the homestead or other exempt property would not
be found in the estate and, therefore, would not be subject to
recovery by the Department of Social Services.
(i) Fraudulent conveyances
The effectiveness of lifetime transfers for defeating Medi-
caid recoupment is doubtful after the decision in Crabb v.
Mager.9 5 There an appellate court held that the Debtor and
Creditor Law may be used in conjunction with section 369 of the
Social Services Law to set aside an allegedly fraudulent trans-
fer. 6 With the transfer set aside, the homestead is included in
the Medicaid recipient's estate from which the Department of
Social Services can recoup its expenses. 7
In Crabb, Gladys Mager, at seventy-nine years of age, be-
came a patient in a nursing home and began receiving medical
assistance. Shortly thereafter, she gratuitously transferred her
92. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 365-a(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). The statute pro-
vides in part:
'Medical assistance' shall mean payment of part or all of the cost of care, services
and supplies which are necessary to prevent, diagnose, correct or cure conditions
in the person that cause acute suffering, endanger life, result in illness or infir-
mity, interfere with his capacity for normal activity, or threaten some significant
handicap and which are furnished an eligible person is [in] accordance with this
title, and the regulations of the department.
Id.
93. N.Y. Soc. Saav. LAW § 104(1) (McKinney 1983). The statute provides that
"[any public assistance or care received by such person shall constitute an implied con-
tract." Id.
94. Id.
95. 66 A.D.2d 20, 412 N.Y.S.2d 508 (4th Dep't 1979).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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house to her son and daughter-in-law.9 8 At Mrs. Mager's death,
the homestead was not included in her estate and, based on the
provisions of section 369(1)(b)," was no longer property from
which the Department could recover medical assistance correctly
paid.100 The court looked to the Debtor and Creditor Law,10 1
however, under which the creditors of a person who fraudulently
conveys property may have the conveyance set aside.102 Accord-
ing to the court, the local Department of Social Services, having
a claim against Mrs. Mager's estate for benefits paid, was a cred-
itor.10 3 Therefore, the Department could have the fraudulent
conveyance set aside, subject to any contrary provision of law.'"
The court found no conflict between the Debtor and Creditor
Law and Social Services Law section 369(1)(b), which limits re-
covery by the Department to the deceased recipient's estate.
Rather, the court held that the Department could use the reme-
dies of the Debtor and Creditor Law to set aside the fraudulent
conveyance, thus bringing it back into the estate from which the
98. Because the house was considered homestead property, Mrs. Mager's ownership
had not affected her original eligibility for Medicaid. Id. at 21, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 509. The
gratuitous transfer, similarly, did not defeat her continued eligibility, because the court
had found in an earlier action that the transfer had not been made to qualify for assis-
tance, but "to advance the inheritance expectation of her son, to provide consideration
for past services and to defeat the future lien interest" of the Department of Social Ser-
vices in the estate at her death. In re Mager, 57 A.D.2d 725, 725, 395 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786
(4th Dep't 1977).
99. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 369(1)(b) (McKinney 1983). The relevant portion of the
statute provides:
Any inconsistent provision of this chapter or other law notwithstanding, .
(b) there shall be no adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance cor-
rectly paid on behalf of such individual under this title, except from the estate of
an individual who was sixty-five years of age or older when he received such assis-
tance, and then only after the death of his surviving spouse, if any, and only at a
time when he has no surviving child who is under twenty-one years of age or is
blind or permanently and totally disabled ....
Id.
100. Crabb v. Mager, 66 A.D.2d at 23, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
101. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 278, 279 (McKinney 1945).
102. Creditors whose claims have matured do not have such rights as against "a
purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the
purchase, or one who has derived title immediately or mediately from such a purchaser."
Id. § 278(1).
103. Crabb v. Mager, 66 A.D.2d at 24, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 510. A creditor is defined as a
"person having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated,
absolute, fixed or contingent." N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 270.
104. Crabb v. Mager, 66 A.D.2d at 24, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
21
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Department was permitted by the Social Services Law to satisfy
its claim.105
(ii) Limitations on recoupment
Under section 104 of the Social Services Law,106 the Depart-
ment may recover the cost of medical assistance not only from
the recipient's estate, but also from the estate of a person liable
for his support.1 0 7 It may even bring fraudulently conveyed as-
sets back into an estate for this purpose. Section 369, which
deals specifically with recovery of medical benefits correctly
paid,108 imposes limits on the Department's right to recover.
First, the Department may not recover against the recipi-
ent's estate so long as his spouse is living or he has any living
child who is under the age of twenty-one years, blind, or perma-
nently and totally disabled.10 9 The provision, however, may not
105. Id. at 25-26, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 511-12.
106. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 104 (McKinney 1983). See supra notes 93-94 and ac-
companying text.
107. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 104(1). The statute limits recovery to funds expended
during the 10 year period preceding (1) the discovery of the person's real or personal
property or (2) his death should he die leaving real or personal property. Id.
108. Id. § 369(1)(b).
109. Id. See, e.g., In re Estate of Rundell, 41 A.D.2d 995, 344 N.Y.S.2d 6 (3d Dep't
1973); In re Estate of McLane, 90 Misc. 2d 1067, 398 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sur. Ct. Ontario
County 1976).
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 369 was enacted to meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(18) (1976), thereby qualifying the state for federal funds. In re Estate of War-
ing, 11 Misc. 2d 421, 422-23, 444 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1981). The
federal statute provides:
A State plan for medical assistance must -
(18) provide that no lien may be imposed against the property of any individ-
ual prior to his death on account of medical assistance paid or to be paid on his
behalf under the plan (except pursuant to the judgment of a court on account of
benefits incorrectly paid on behalf of such individual), and that there shall be no
adjustment or recovery (except in the case of an individual who was 65 years of
age or older when he received such assistance, from his estate, and then only after
the death of his surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when he has no sur-
viving child who is under age 21 or ... is blind or permanently and totally dis-
abled . . .) of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of such individual
under the plan.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18).
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 369 imposes similar limitations on recovery so that those
receiving medical assistance will not become impoverished. In re Estate of Waring, 111
Misc. 2d at 422, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (citing In re Estate of Kummer, 104 Misc. 2d 978,
982, 429 N.Y.S.2d 983, 986 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1980); In re Estate of Harris, 88
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/10
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have been intended to be all embracing. For example, the law
disallows recovery not only from a recipient's estate while his
spouse is alive, but from the spouse's estate once both have died.
Thus, the beneficiaries of the estate may receive a windfall. "'
Had the statute provided for recovery from the estate of a
spouse as a relative who had been responsible for the support of
a recipient prior to the recipient's death, recovery could be had
from the estate of the spouse. The court, in In re Estate of War-
ing,"' recommended that the legislature remedy this situation.
Similarly, under New York law, there is no requirement that a
parent provide for the support of a child after the parent's
death.112 Recovery, however, is precluded from the estate of a
recipient who is survived by a child who is under the age of
twenty-one years, blind or disabled, even where the estate in no
way provides for the benefit of such child. This also may be an
unintended result of the law.
Second, section 369(1)(b) prevents recovery from a deceased
recipient's estate of medical assistance correctly paid prior to
Misc. 2d 60, 64, 387 N.Y.S.2d 796, 798 (Sur. Ct. Wayne County 1976), afl'd, 61 A.D.2d
881, 402 N.Y.S.2d 978 (4th Dep't 1978)).
110. In re Estate of Waring, 111 Misc. 2d at 423, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
111. 111 Misc. 2d 421, 423, 444 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411. In Waring, both husband and
wife had been recipients of medical assistance. Where, however, one spouse has sufficient
income and resources, but refuses to provide assistance for the medical care of the other
spouse, the Department of Social Services may recover from the estate of the responsible
spouse at his death. Estate of Imburgia, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 29, 1984, at 13, col. 5 (Sur. Ct.
Nassau County). The court distinguished this case from Waring, which did not involve
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(3)(a) (McKinney 1983) (erroneously stated in N.Y.L.J. as §
366(5)(a)). Section 366(3)(a) provides that medical assistance be furnished to an appli-
cant whose responsible relative, having sufficient income and resources, refuses to pro-
vide the necessary assistance. "In such cases, however, the furnishing of such assistance
shall create an implied contract with such relative, and the cost thereof may be recovered
from such relative." N.Y. Soc. SEnv. LAW § 366(3)(a). Although N.Y. Soc. Saav. LAW §
369(1)(b) has a general prohibition of recovery of medical assistance correctly paid, it
further provides "that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit any ad-
justment or recovery for medical assistance furnished pursuant to subdivision three of
section three hundred sixty-six of this chapter." The court, therefore, found that Mr.
Imburgia's refusal to provide for his wife's medical care triggered the implied contract
under § 366(3)(a), thereby allowing for recovery from his estate. Estate of Imburgia,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 29, 1984, at 13, col. 6.
112. Although N.Y. EST. PowERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 allows the surviving spouse,
in certain instances, to elect to take a share of the decedent's estate, there is no similar
provision for a child.
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the date when he attained sixty-five years of age.11 In determin-
ing the constitutionality of this statute, the New York Court of
Appeals noted that in contrast to the more difficult eligibility
requirements for those under age sixty-five (total and perma-
nent disability, catastrophic illness, blindness, or public assis-
tance status), economic need is the sole criterion for eligibility
for those sixty-five and over."" The New York Court of Appeals
has held that this provision does not violate the equal protection
clause of either the federal or state constitutions, because the
difference in treatment of those under sixty-five and those over
sixty-five has a rational basis and the two groups are clearly
distinguishable."15
C. Lawful Means to Transfer Assets and Qualify for Medicaid
Although many transfers of property will disqualify the
transferor from eligibility for Medicaid under Social Services
Law section 366(5), 116 certain transfers do not have this effect.
1. Exempt resources
As has already been noted, section 366(5) requires that "the
uncompensated value of any nonexempt resource transferred
within twenty-four months prior to the date of application for
medical assistance" 17 be included in determining the assets
available to a person whose initial or continuing eligibility for
medical assistance is at stake. 1 8 The statute also creates a re-
buttable presumption that any such transfers made within the
stated time period were made for the purpose of qualifying for
such assistance. 19 Inasmuch as the new section refers only to
the transfer of nonexempt assets, arguably, one should now be
able to transfer a homestead at any time without being disquali-
113. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 369(1) (McKinney 1983). See supra note 99.
114. In re Estate of Davis, 57 N.Y.2d 382, 388, 442 N.E.2d 1227, 1230, 456 N.Y.S.2d
716, 719 (1982).
115. In re Estate of Davis, 57 N.Y.2d 382, 442 N.E.2d 1227, 456 N.Y.S.2d 716
(1982).
116. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 366(5) (McKinney 1983). See supra note 71.
117. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(5) (McKinney 1983).
118. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
119. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 366(5) (McKinney 1983). See supra note 71.
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fled from eligibility. 2 '
Section 366(5), however, addresses only eligibility for assis-
tance under section 366. It does not deal with recoupment under
section 369. The provisions of the Debtor and Creditor Law with
respect to conveyances by one about to incur debts1 21 presuma-
bly may still be used to set aside and bring back into an estate a
homestead fraudulently conveyed at any time.12 2 Therefore, in
the case of a transfer of exempt property which is not covered
under section 366(5), the Department of Social Services may
still have a valid claim against the transferor's estate for recoup-
ment of benefits correctly paid, provided the transferor was
sixty-five years or older when he received medical assistance and
has no surviving spouse or surviving child who is under twenty-
one years, blind, or permanently and totally disabled. If, on the
other hand, the transfer was not fraudulent, the property would
not be subject to creditors' claims at death.
Since a personal residence is often the most significant asset
in the estate of a Medicaid recipient, such a recipient might wish
to convey a remainder interest 2 ' in the house to his intended
beneficiaries to minimize his probate estate. By retaining a life
estate, 24 the transferor preserves the income tax benefits availa-
120. Note, however, that the intent of the transferor may still be a factor. Sherman
v. Sanfilippo, 74 A.D.2d 675, 442 N.Y.S.2d 540 (3d Dep't 1980).
121. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 275 (McKinney 1945). The statute provides:
Conveyances by a person about to incur debts
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred without fair considera-
tion when the person making the conveyance or entering into the obligation in-
tends or believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature,
is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors.
Id.
122. In Sherman v. Sanfilippo, 74 A.D.2d at 676, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 542, the court
denied medical assistance although the applicant had transferred her house more than
one year (the prohibited period at the time) prior to her application for such assistance.
Although the transfer of a homestead (exempt property) presumably will not disqualilfy
an applicant from eligibility for medical assistance under the new law, a fraudulent con-
veyance of such property may well cause it to be brought back into the estate under the
provisions of the Debtor and Creditor Law for recoupment purposes. See generally
supra notes 89-96 and accompaning text.
123. A "remainder" interest is the interest one has in "[t]he property that passes to
a beneficiary after the expiration of an intervening income interest." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1162 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
124. A "life estate" is "[ain estate whose duration is limited to the life of the party
holding it, or some other person." Id. at 833.
19841
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ble to owners of real property. 12 In addition, the transferor does
not subject himself to the whims of the transferee. Finally, since
he owns a life estate in the homestead, it remains exempt 12 and
should not be subject to creditors' claims, provided the transfer
of the remainder interest occurs well in advance of the applica-
tion for medical assistance and no fraud can be shown. Since the
new section 366(5) speaks only of "determining the initial or
continuing eligibility of any person for assistance'12  and con-
tains no reference to a "voluntary transfer [to defeat the] future
right to recovery of medical assistance"' 28 as did the repealed
section 366(1)(e), it would appear that the "implied contract"
between the recipient and the Department129 is no longer in-
tended to cover exempt assets properly transferred prior to ini-
tial eligibility.
Eligibility, however, may be jeopardized under section
366(5) by a transfer of nonexempt property. If medical benefits
are paid without knowledge of an improper transfer, the benefits
are incorrectly paid and, as such, are also subject to recoupment
125. The interest paid on an outstanding mortgage may be used as a deduction in
determining taxable income. I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1983). This section provides: "General
Rule. - There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the
taxable year on indebtedness." Id. Similarly, taxes paid on or in connection with real
property (e.g., school taxes) may be deducted from gross income for the taxable year
within which paid or accrued. Id. § 164(a)(1).
126. The New York regulations covering the exempt status of the homestead
provide:
(b)(1) A homestead of the applicant or recipient shall be considered as his
homestead, and therefore exempt, while he is under the care in a medical institu-
tion if it continues to be maintained as such by him or on his behalf. 'Continues to
be maintained' shall include the leasing or renting of the homestead. In such
cases, the income shall be treated in accordance with subdivision (a) of this sec-
tion. [Net income from realty is considered current income and applied to the
income exemption.]
(2) A homestead shall lose its exempt status if the following conditions are
met:
(i) the homestead is not being maintained on the client's behalf;
(ii) no spouse, minor child or blind or disabled child of the client is living in
the homestead; and
(iii) the agency has medical verification that the client will be unable to re-
turn to such homestead.
N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 360.6 (1983).
127. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(5)(a) (McKinney 1983).
128. Id. § 366(1)(e) (repealed 1982). See supra note 35.
129. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 104(1). See supra note 94.
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under section 369(1)(a) during the transferor's life. The provi-
sion of the Debtor and Creditor Law on conveyances made with
intent to defraud also applies in this situation.130 Where a trans-
fer is made more than two years before an incapacity that trig-
gers an application for assistance, the two year statutory pre-
sumption does not apply. The burden of proof may still be on
the transferor, however, to show that the transfer was not fraud-
ulent. ' ' Although it is unpredictable how far back a court will
look, one willing to give up dominion and control of property at
a relatively early age may leave the door open for eligibility. Par-
ticularly as they get older, however, many persons are reluctant
to give up such control for fear of being dependent on the gener-
osity of family members who were the donees of such prop-
erty.132 Furthermore, to the extent the gift exceeds the donor's
unused equivalent exemption, payment of a gift tax will be re-
quired.133 Should the original donee later transfer property back
to the donor, their roles reverse and a gift tax may then be im-
posed upon the original donee (now the donor).
2. Discretionary trusts
To eliminate some of the problems inherent in an outright
transfer, a discretionary sprinkling trust 3 may be used to re-
130. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 276 (McKinney 1945). The statute provides:
Conveyance made with intent to defraud
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as
distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either pre-
sent or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors.
Id.
131. Sherman v. Sanfilippo, 74 A.D.2d at 676, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
132. The donees may have the potential for being spendthrifts or might not be will-
ing to use funds at a later date to assist their donor.
133. Sections 2501 and 2505 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 impose on the
donor a tax on transfers of property by gift to the extent the value of the transfers
exceeds certain authorized deductions and exclusions. I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2503, 2505 (West
1983) and Treas. Reg. § 25.2501-1, T.D. 7910, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,371, 40,372 (1984). A uni-
fied credit, equivalent to an exemption at the lowest bracket, is then applied against the
tax imposed by § 2501. I.R.C. § 2505 (West 1983). The unified credit in 1984 is $96,300,
which is equivalent to an exemption (at the lowest bracket) of $325,000. The unified
credit will be increasing through 1987 when it will remain at $192,800, equivalent to an
exemption of $600,000. Id. §§ 2001, 2501.
134. A trust is an arrangement under which one person (grantor, settlor, donor, tes-
tator, testatrix) gives part or all of his property to a trustee, who takes legal title to the
property and manages it in accordance with the creator's instructions, accumulating or
1984]
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duce the resources "actually available" to a potential applicant
or recipient of medical assistance.135 To avoid the statutory pre-
sumption, the trust must be created more than twenty-four
months prior to the date of application. The earlier a person
makes such a transfer, the better his chances will be to prove
that the transfer was not made for the purpose of qualifying for
assistance.' The trust should be irrevocable and should give a
wholly independent trustee absolute and uncontrolled discretion
to use such amounts of income as he determines necessary for
the benefit of the grantor and other persons (generally family
members) and to accumulate the balance of income.13 7 Principal
may also be invaded in the trustee's discretion for any benefi-
ciaries other than the grantor. 38 The grantor, in turn, must not
paying out the income and, eventually, the principal to one or more persons or organiza-
tions. See S. KURTZ, supra note 1, at 185-89.
A "discretionary trust" is one "in which trustees have discretion as to types of in-
vestment and also as to whether and when distributions may be made to beneficiaries."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1354 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
A "sprinkling" or "spray" trust is a discretionary trust for more than one benefi-
ciary. The trustee determines which beneficiaries shall receive distributions and in what
amount. Provision may also be made for accumulation. Id. at 1356.
135. When a trustee is given discretion as to distributions, the property is no longer
controlled by the grantor and is therefore not actually available to him.
136. There are several reasons that one might have to create an irrevocable discre-
tionary sprinkling trust. For example, a person entering into a business venture, may
wish to make provisions for family members so that they will not suffer should the busi-
ness prove to be unsuccessful. A person who is particularly impressionable, e.g., a young
person who has received a sizeable inheritance or a recently widowed person, might cre-
ate such a trust to protect himself and his family against his own indiscretion.
137. The grantor might instead be the sole income beneficiary with alternate provi-
sions should he become disabled. In that event, the trustee would be given discretion to
sprinkle income among the grantor, his spouse and other dependents. See infra note 181
and accompanying text for suggested provisions to determine when a disability exists.
Note, however, that as a general rule, transfers in trust for the benefit of a grantor-
beneficiary are void as against the grantor's existing or future creditors. N.Y. EsT. Pow-
ERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1 (McKinney 1967). See also Dillon v. Spilo, 275 N.Y. 275, 9
N.E.2d 864 (1937); In re Coyle's Trust, 280 A.D. 857, 113 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1st Dep't 1952),
afl'd, 305 N.Y. 809, 113 N.E.2d 556, 122 N.Y.S.2d (pagination shown as 305 N.Y. 807, Ct.
App.) (1953). Some commentators believe this to be the case even where the trust cre-
ated by the grantor-beneficiary is merely a spendthrift trust, support trust, or a transfer
in which the trustee is given absolute discretion to pay the income to the settlor or accu-
mulate it. See Rohan, Practice Commentary to N.Y. EST. PowEms & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1
(McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). Where, however, the settlor retains only a partial benefi-
cial interest in the trust, his creditors may reach the trust only to the extent of such
interest. Id.
138. This will preclude trust corpus from being considered an available resource to
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/10
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be able to demand that assets be distributed to him.13 9 So long
as the grantor has parted with such dominion and control and
there are no "sniffings" of a fraudulent transfer, his creditors
should not be able to reach any of the trust's assets.1 40
If the trustee has unfettered discretion as to income payable
to the grantor, such income will not be an actual resource and,
possibly, will not be deemed an available resource for purposes
of determining medical assistance eligibility.14 Since principal
the grantor. On the other hand, the draftsman might take the less cautious path by
giving the trustee discretion to invade corpus on behalf of the grantor provided that no
such invasions be made for the grantor's medical expenses. This less prudent approach,
however, may waive a red flag for those looking for fraudulent intent. This should be
pointed out to the grantor.
Should the grantor and draftsman opt instead for extreme prudence, discretionary
invasions for anyone responsible for the grantor's support (e.g., his spouse) should be
limited to the use of that person, with specific provision that the funds not be used by
that person for the payment of the grantor's medical expenses.
139. To the extent the grantor reserves the right to revoke the trust, it is an availa-
ble resource to him.
140. There is a difference between the Debtor & Creditor Law and the requirements
for Medicaid eligibility. The Debtor & Creditor Law does not look to the intent of the
transferor as determinative. To the extent the grantor may benefit from property he has
placed in trust, it is subject to his creditor's claims. For Medicaid, though, there is a
rebuttable presumption that transfers of nonexempt property within 24 months prior to
applying for initial or continuing eligibility were made with intent to qualify for assis-
tance. Even if one is deemed ineligible because the transferred assets are included as an
available resource, the period of ineligibility is reasonably limited: 24 months from the
date of the transfer if excess resources are $12,000 or less, with an additional month of
ineligibility for each $2000 in excess of $12,000. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 275 (McKin-
ney 1945); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 355(5) (McKinney 1983). Transfers made more than 24
months prior to the application for eligibility may also be considered available resources
where there is suspicion of fraudulent intent. See Harrington v. Blum, 117 Misc. 2d 623,
458 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
141. See Taiis, Medicaid as an Estate Planning Tool for the Elderly, 66 MASS. L.
Rv. 89 (1981). Compare the wholly discretionary irrevocable trust, where the grantor
gives up dominion and control, with a revocable trust, where the grantor reserves the
power to terminate the trust. The grantor's creditors can reach the revocable trust assets.
The N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law provides that "[a] disposition in trust for the use of
the creator is void as against the existing or subsequent creditors of the creator." N.Y.
EST. PowEa.s & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1 (McKinney 1967). Since the grantor continues to
control the "purse strings," the assets also remain available to him for Medicaid eligibil-
ity purposes. Similarly, if a grantor creates a trust which upon his disability will be con-
verted to an irrevocable trust to benefit him and any other persons desired, his creditors
can reach the trust assets. N.Y. EST. Pow Rs & TRUSTS LAW § 10-7.2 provides that
[piroperty covered by a general power of appointment which is presently exercisa-
ble . . is subject to the payment of the claims of creditors of the donee . .. . It is
immaterial whether the power was created in the donee by himself or by some
other person, or whether the donee has or has not purported to exercise the
29
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may not be invaded for the grantor, it will not be deemed an
available resource. Recent case law suggests that where the gran-
tor is the sole beneficiary and the trustee has discretion to in-
vade principal for his benefit, trust principal is a resource availa-
ble to him.
For example, in Harrington v. Blum,"42 Margaret Harring-
ton created and transferred assets worth $60,000 to an irrevoca-
ble inter vivos trust providing for her own needs by authorizing
invasion of principal in the discretion of the trustee, her son.1 43
The New York County Supreme Court held that the denial of
Mrs. Harrington's application for health care assistance, made
almost four years after she created the trust, was "neither arbi-
trary nor capricious."'' The court looked to the state constitu-
tion which provides that "'[t]he aid, care and support of the
needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and
by such of its subdivisions.' ",45 In addition, the court reviewed
certain requirements of the Social Services Law,"46 stating that
"it is clear that medical assistance is to be limited to needy per-
power.
Since the trust will be revocable until such time as he becomes incapacitated and seeks
medical assistance, the statutory presumption will prevail.
Where, however, the grantor is not seeking to qualify for Medicaid benefits, the con-
vertible trust is an excellent estate planning tool to assure the orderly transfer and man-
agement of assets upon disability, while avoiding the time, nuisance, and expense in-
volved in the appointment of a conservator or committee. If the trust is not fully funded,
a durable power of attorney should be used to transfer all of the grantor's assets into the
trust. To maximize flexibility, the trust should include a "substitution of judgment" pro-
vision, wherein the trustee is empowered to make such payments of income or principal
to such persons as the trustee believes the grantor would have made. The trustee might
even be given discretion to change the dispositive provisions for tax planning purposes in
light of statutory changes (e.g., the marital deduction). See Callahan, supra note 13, at
426-28.
142. 117 Misc. 2d 623, 458 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
143. Id. at 624, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
144. Id. at 625, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
145. Id. at 624, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. 17, § 1).
146. Harrington v. Blum, 117 Misc. 2d at 624 (opinion incorrectly cites § 366(6)(b)
of the Social Services Law; correct cite given in the New York Supplement as §
366(2)(b)), 458 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (quoting N.Y. Soc. SEv. LAW § 365-a (McKinney 1983)
and citing id. § 366(2)(b)). N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 365-a requires that "[tihe amount,
nature and manner of providing medical assistance for needy persons shall be deter-
mined by the public welfare official." N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(2)(b) authorizes the
public welfare official to consider income and resources available to the applicant.
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sons.' 1  Emphasizing that "'needy' does not encompass a per-
son who may create that need by failing or refusing to provide
for her own needs, ' 148 the court turned to the regulations of the
Department of Social Services which provide that "[rlesources
shall be so utilized as to eliminate or reduce the need for public
assistance . . . and conserve public funds . . . . Applicants and
recipients shall generally be required to utilize available re-
sources and to apply for and otherwise pursue potentially availa-
ble resources. 149 While Mrs. Harrington had provided for her
own needs, her son's failure as trustee to exercise discretion in
her behalf was suspect of a conflict of interest. 50
Harrington involved a trust created by a grantor solely for
her own benefit. The court's decision may have turned on the
son's conflict of interest as trustee. There is no indication that
when Mrs. Harrington created the trust almost four years ear-
lier, she did so with intent to avail herself of Medicaid benefits
at a later date and to preserve her own assets for her son. It
would appear, however, that New York Estates, Powers &
Trusts Law (EPTL) section 7-3.1, entitled Disposition in trust
for creator void as against creditors, precludes a grantor-sole
beneficiary of a trust from doing so.1"1
Where there is no intent to perpetrate a fraud, the taint
may not be present if the grantor, when in reasonably good
health with no foreseeable disability, creates a sprinkling trust,
provided that the trustee has no conflict of interest and the
147. Harrington v. Blum, 117 Misc. 2d at 624, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
148. Id. at 624, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 866 (citing Flynn v. Bates, 67 A.D.2d 975, 413
N.Y.S.2d 446 (2d Dep't 1979); Barie v. Lavine, 48 A.D.2d 36, 367 N.Y.S.2d 587 (3d Dep't
1975).
149. Harrington v. Blum, 117 Misc. 2d at 624-25, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 866 (quoting N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 352.23(a) (1982)).
150. Harrington v. Blum, 117 Misc. 2d at 625, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
151. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 7-3.1 (McKinney 1967).
[An otherwise appropriate procedure cannot be utilized to perpetrate a fraud. In
the establishment of inter vivos or testamentary trusts, circumscriptions which
would preclude the invasion of the trust to pay costs which would otherwise be
payable from a public program can be created. However, with reference to inter
vivos trusts, it appears that EPTL 7-3.1 would preclude a settlor of a trust who is
also the beneficiary from availing himself of this circumscription. Such transfers
suggest part of a scheme to perpetrate a fraud.
Letter from Surrogate Bertram R. Gelfand to author (Dec. 27, 1983) (discussing, in gen-
eral, transfers of property and potential claims of the Department of Social Services).
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other beneficiaries are not solely persons responsible for the
grantor's support.162 The grantor might also retain a testamen-
tary power to appoint the trust remainder among his descend-
ants or anyone other than himself, his estate, his creditors, or
the creditors of his estate. This will enable him to determine at a
later time who will receive the trust remainder. Despite the fact
that the grantor has parted with dominion and control over in-
come and principal payable to him and has retained a limited
testamentary power of appointment, the trust will nonetheless
be deemed a taxable gift because the trustee has unrestricted
power to pay income and principal to the other beneficiaries.15 3
The special power of appointment should not, however, affect
the rights of creditors,'54 provided the disposition is not fraudu-
lent itself.15 5
By creating a fully discretionary irrevocable sprinkling trust
with a special testamentary power of appointment, a person may
be able to eliminate the "taint" of "available resources" for
Medicaid eligibility purposes (assuming the assets are irrevoca-
bly transferred sufficiently before the twenty-four month pe-
riod). At the same time he can preserve flexibility over the dis-
position of his assets at death.
152. Since a spouse is a responsible relative, the beneficiaries should not be limited
to grantor and spouse.
153. See Rev. Rul. 77-378, 1977-2 C.B. 348; cf. Rev. Rul. 76-276, 1976-2 C.B. 299
(where grantor's retained interest in an irrevocable trust was incapable of valuation and
was deemed a taxable gift because the trustee had absolute discretion to distribute prin-
cipal as income). Although the sprinkling provisions would cause the trust to be taxable
for federal gift tax purposes, the grantor's ultimate goal of providing for family members
is carried out through "substitution of judgment" by empowering the trustee to pay in-
come and principal to the other beneficiaries as the trustee feels the grantor would have
done. See supra note 141. In addition, a gift tax would only be payable if the value of the
trust exceeds the grantor's unused equivalent exemption. See supra note 133 and accom-
panying text.
The transfer would not be taxable as a completed gift if the grantor retained a lim-
ited testamentary power of appointment but did not empower the trustee to sprinkle
income and principal among other beneficiaries. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b), T.D. 7910, 48
Fed. Reg. 40,371, 40,374 (1983). This, however, would limit flexibility in providing for
family members while the grantor is incapacitated.
154. N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 10-7.1 (McKinney 1967) provides that
"[piroperty covered by a special power of appointment is not subject to the payment of
the claims of creditors of the donee, his estate or the expenses of administering his
estate."
155. See Glasser, Practice Commentary to N.Y. EST. PowEss & TRUST LAW § 10-7.1
(McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
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3. Private annuities
Another approach is the private annuity. This option is par-
ticularly attractive for the individual who does not wish to give
the trustee discretion to sprinkle income and principal among
other beneficiaries. A private or family annuity is a contractual
arrangement between two individuals, usually closely related,
wherein the transferee promises to pay an annuity to the trans-
feror in consideration for the property transferred to the trans-
feree. 1" Generally, the annuity is for life. 157 In addition to pro-
viding income security to an older family member and removing
assets from his taxable estate, the private annuity enables him
to transfer property to other family members with beneficial tax
consequences.5 8 The private annuity has three components:
(1) investment in the contract (treated as return of capital
and not taxed),
(2) annuity income (taxed as ordinary income), and
(3) capital gain to the extent the present value of the annu-
ity exceeds the transferor's basis.6 9
For example, Mrs. Harrington,' instead of creating a trust,
could have transferred her assets valued at $60,000 to her son in
exchange for his promise to pay her $4500 annually. Assuming
she was seventy years of age and transferred the property in
1983, the present value of her annuity would be $27,234.90.s1 If
her basis in the property was $25,000, she would have a gain of
$2,234.90.162 The excess of the fair market value of the property
over the value of the annuity received would constitute a gift to
156. S. KURTZ, supra note 1, at 562.
157. Allen, Factors that Will Influence the Method to Handle Intra-Family Prop-
erty Transfers, 10 TAx'N FOR LAW. 228, 228 (1982).
158. Id.
159. See generally I.R.C. §§ 72(a), (b) (West 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.72-1, T.D. 6676,
1963-2 C.B. 41, 45; id. § 1.72-2, T.D. 6885, 1966-2 C.B. 307, 334; id. § 1.72-3 (1956); id. §
1.72-4, T.D. 7352, 1975-1 C.B. 34; Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 129-35.
161. Using the 10% tables (effective Oct. 31, 1983) for a 70 year old person to re-
ceive a life annuity of $4500: $4500 x 6.0522 = $27,234.90. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5,
48 Fed. Reg. 50,087, 50,108 (1983); Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
162. Gain realized is determined by deducting the transferor's basis in the property
from the present value of the annuity. $27,234.90 - $25,000.00 = $2,234.90. Rev. Rul. 69-
74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
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her son of $32,765.10 ($60,000 minus $27,234.90)."6s She would
be entitled to a deduction of $10,000 for the annual exclusion. ' "
Note that if she had three children, she could create an equal
separate annuity with each, minimizing the taxable gift by
utilizing three annual exclusions of $10,000 each.' 5 In either
event, however, no gift tax would be incurred so long as her
equivalent exemption had not been exhausted.' 66 Although there
would be no gift tax, the gift portion might well be deemed a
transfer without consideration and, to that extent, an "available
resource" for medicaid eligibility purposes should the transac-
tion occur within the twenty-four month period. The gain would
be reported ratably over Mrs. Harrington's lifetime and only
from that portion includible in gross income when applying sec-
tion 72 of the Internal Revenue Code. 67 The investment in the
contract would be her basis in the property transferred. In addi-
tion, the taxable and nontaxable portion of each payment during
Mrs. Harrington's lifetime would be determined by utilizing the
figures calculated- above, an exclusion ratio, and her life
expectancy.' 68
An annuity is considered a sale or exchange. In addition, it
163. Id.
164. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1983).
165. Id.
166. See supra note 133.
167. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
168. I.R.C. §§ 72(a)-(c) (West 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.72-1, T.D. 6676, 1963-2 C.B. 41,
45; id. § 1.72-2, T.D. 6885, 1966-2 C.B. 307, 334; id. § 1.72-3 (1956); id. § 1.72-4, T.D.
7352, 1975-1 C.B. 34; Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
The expected return would be $67,500 (annual proceeds of $4500 multiplied by 15,
the life expectancy) using No. 107, Expectation of Life and Expected Deaths by Race,
Age, and Sex: 1979, in STATISTIcA ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 72 (103d ed. 1982); I.R.C.
§ 72(c)(3) (West 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.72-5 (1956). The exclusion ratio is 37.04%:
$25,000 (investment in contract) divided by $67,500 (expected return). I.R.C. § 72(b)
(West 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.72-4, T.D. 7352, 1975-1 C.B. 34; Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B.
43. Of the annual proceeds of $4500, $1,666.80 (37.04% of $4500) would be excluded each
year as a return of capital. I.R.C. § 72(b) (West 1983); Tress. Reg. § 1.72-4, T.D. 7352,
1975-1 C.B. 34; Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43. Of the balance, $148.99 would be treated
as capital gain (capital gain income ($2,234.90) divided by life expectancy (15) equals
$148.99) and $2,684.21 as ordinary annuity income. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43. An-
nual proceeds less the exclusion amount and capital gain portion equals ordinary annuity
income. Should the annuitant live more than her life expectancy of 15 years, subsequent
payments would have two components - the exclusion of $1,666.80 and ordinary annu-
ity income of $2,833.20. I.R.C. §§ 72(a)-(c) (West 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.72-4, T.D. 7352,
1975-1 C.B. 34; Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
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is distinguishable from a trust in that the annuity requires that
a specified sum of money be payable annually.'1 9 Therefore, sub-
ject possibly to the gift portion, it should not fall within section
366(5)(a) of the Social Services Law as the uncompensated value
of a nonexempt, transferred resource. 170 Where a testamentary
trust created an annuity, a surrogate's court recently refused to
authorize invasion of principal for the trust annuitant. 71 It
would seem to follow that in a private annuity (unlike a discre-
tionary trust created by a settlor for his own benefit, e.g., Mrs.
Harrington's trust), the transferor is entitled only to the annual
annuity payment and not to any of the additional property
169. In In re Estate of Miller, 101 Misc. 2d 778, 421 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sur. Ct. Monroe
County 1979), the court looked to the language in a will creating an annuity payable in a
testamentary trust. The will provided for a fixed sum payable out of income, and from
principal only to the extent income is insufficient. If income is greater than the annuity
amount, only the annuity amount is payable to the beneficiary. Id. at 779, 421 N.Y.S.2d
at 982. The court distinguished the annuity from a trust which can pay or apply to the
use of the beneficiary all of the income earned on the trust principal. Id. at 780, 421
N.Y.S.2d at 983 (citing N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.6 (McKinney 1967)).
170. N.Y. Soc. Sanv. LAW § 366(5)(a) (McKinney 1983). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 52-54.
171. In re Estate of Miller, 101 Misc. 2d at 780, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 983. In holding that
it could not authorize invasion of principal under N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-
1.6 (McKinney 1967) where the trust provided for the beneficiary to receive a fixed sum
from income and only from principal if necessary, the court looked to the legislative
history of the modification of spendthrift trusts in New York with respect to creditors'
rights. In re Estate of Miller, 101 Misc. 2d at 780, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 983 (citing TEMPO-
RARY STATE COMM. ON THE LAW OF ESTATES, REPORT No. 6.6B, RELAXATION OF SPEND-
THRIFT TRUST CONCEPT -TERMINATION OF TRUSTS - CREDITORS, 2 N.Y. LEGIS. Doc., No.
19, at 459 (1963) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]).
Unlike spendthrift trusts, annuities were never subject to limitations and, therefore,
were unaffected by the new laws regarding such trusts. REPORT at 465, 476-77. The laws
were altered to allow invasion of corpus under certain circumstances to carry out the
testator's intent where
through lack of experience of the draftsman, lack of thought on the part of the
settlor or testator, or the result of inflation or substantial decrease in the corpus of
the trust which has been considered by neither of the above, no provision for
invasion of corpus has been inserted in the instrument. The Court being without
power to invade is helpless to grant relief and the intent of the settlor or testator
that the primary object or objects of his bounty be provided for is thus frustrated.
In re Estate of Miller, 101 Misc. 2d at 780, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 983 (quoting REPORT at 468)
(emphasis added by court). See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text. The court
made a distinction between trusts and annuities, finding that annuities provide for inva-
sion of trust principal if income is insufficient to meet the precise amount to be paid,
thereby leaving no question as to the testator's intent. In re Estate of Miller, 101 Misc.
2d at 780, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
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transferred. Presumably then, in the example given, only the
$4500 annual annuity would be considered in determining Medi-
caid eligibility for Mrs. Harrington. If she had no other income,
the $4500 would be exempt. 172
III. The Disabled Beneficiary: Discretionary Trusts
A. Background
In addition to helping an individual plan for his own future
health care needs, the estate planner is often called upon to ad-
vise a parent how best to provide for a handicapped child while
preserving assets for other children. When a trust for a third
party beneficiary has appropriate discretionary provisions, the
courts may be powerless to convert the trust corpus into an
"available resource" of a disabled income beneficiary for pur-
poses of determining that beneficiary's eligibility for medical as-
sistance. This is particularly significant to an individual who
may feel obligated to provide an equal or greater portion of his
estate for an incapacitated child or parent,17 3 but without total
sacrifice to his other children. If an individual's assets are lim-
ited, he may wish to ensure that the disabled person will benefit
from government assistance programs, while insulating the trust
assets from the claims of a social welfare agency.174
Eligibility requirements for SSI and Medicaid benefits for a
handicapped child are similar to those for Medicaid benefits for
an elderly person. 175 To qualify, the handicapped child must
172. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(2)(a)(8); see also supra note 51.
173. This section deals with third party, disabled beneficiaries. For convenience, dis-
cussion focuses on a disabled child, but is equally relevant to any disabled third party.
174. Concern that governmental agencies will reach the estate or trust has prompted
some individuals to create secret trusts by giving money to and imposing a moral obliga-
tion on a friend or relative. Since the morally obligated person may not be legally bound,
there is always the risk that due to his own disabililty, dishonesty, or death, he will not
adequately serve the needs of the incapacitated beneficiary. For those wishing to pre-
serve their assets for other family members, another alternative is to disinherit a handi-
capped child. Unfortunately, it is that child who most likely needs his parents' help more
than the other beneficiaries.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 46-52. This Comment focuses on medical
assistance. For a discussion of SSI and financial planning for a handicapped child, see
Davis, Financial and Estate Planning for Parents of a Child with Handicaps, 5 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 495 (1983).
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have limited income and resources.1 7 6 Consequently, funds that
might vest in the child, such as a custodian account under the
Uniform Gift to Minors Act,177 must be avoided. Similarly, pro-
ceeds from life insurance or pension and profit sharing plans
should not be payable outright to a disabled child.
A good estate plan, utilizing an effective will178 with alter-
nate dispositions, is essential, particularly when a disabled bene-
ficiary is involved. The dispute in In re Estate of Scrivani17 9
could have been avoided had Marie Scrivani not died intes-
tate,180 but with a will providing for the contingency of Mrs.
Molinelli's incapacity. The will might have provided for a discre-
tionary trust for Mrs. Molinelli or for outright distribution to
her heirs if she were incapacitated. Thus, if it is not already ob-
176. The income of a parent with whom the child lives will be deemed to be the
child's income for SSI eligibility purposes. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1167(d) (1983); N.Y. Soc.
Sanv. LAW § 208(6) (McKinney 1983). When a child ceases to live with a parent, the
deeming rules stop applying after the first full month of separation (unless temporary).
20 C.F.R. § 1167(a). A child away at school who comes home on some holidays or week-
ends, however, is considered temporarily away. Id. Eligibility standards for medical assis-
tance are similar. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.724 for a comparison. The New York Eligibility
rule provides:
In establishing standards for determining eligibility for and amount of such
assistance, the department shall take into account only such income and re-
sources, in accordance with federal requirements, as are available to the applicant
or recipient and as would not be required to be disregarded or set aside for future
needs, and there shall be a reasonable evaluation of any such income or resources.
There shall not be taken into consideration the financial responsibility of any ap-
plicant or recipient of assistance under this title unless such applicant or recipient
is such individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under twenty-one
years of age. In determining the eligibility of a child who is categorically eligible as
blind or disabled, .. . the income and resources of parents or spouses of parents
are not considered available to that child if she/he does not regularly share the
common household even if the child returns to the household for periodic visits.
N.Y.Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(2)(b) (McKinney 1983).
177. N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRusTS LAW §§ 7-4.1 to -.13 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
178. For a will to effectuate its intended plan, sufficient assets must pass under the
will. Some examples of assets that do not pass under the terms of the will are: jointly
held property (which passes by operation of law to the survivor), living trusts which
continue after the death of the decedent-grantor, and life insurance and employee bene-
fit plans (which can pass by contract to the named beneficiary) if not payable to the
estate. 1 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 131 (4th ed. 1980); 2 id. at 735. If there are not
sufficient assets in the decedent's name alone, the will plan might not take effect as
anticipated. 1 id. at 131.
179. 116 Misc. 2d 204, 204, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 505 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982). See
supra text accompanying notes 81-90.
180. In re Estate of Scrivani, 116 Misc. 2d at 205, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
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vious that a beneficiary is "incapacitated," the will should set
forth adequate guidelines for making that determination. 18 The
trust must then be drafted to enable the beneficiary to take ad-
vantage of government entitlement programs.182
As a general rule, the Department of Social Services will
deny an application for medical assistance on the grounds that
the trust corpus is an available resource for the payment of med-
ical expenses.183 The applicant has the burden of proving eligi-
bility for medical assistance. 84 The New York regulations for
the medical assistance program require applicants and recipients
to "utilize available resources and to apply for and otherwise
pursue potentially available resources."'185 Until a bona fide ef-
fort has been made on behalf of the needy income beneficiary to
invade the trust corpus, the beneficiary may not be considered a
person who requires medical assistance under Social Services
Law section 366(1). ss
Prior to 1978, the courts consistently directed that the trust
corpus be invaded so that publicly funded programs would not
be used to assist the life beneficiary. 187 This was in keeping with
181. The will (or inter vivos trust) might leave it in the discretion of the trustee, a
family member, or physician(s) to determine if a beneficiary
is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activities by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than twelve months; or who, in the case of a child under the age of eighteen,
suffers from any medically determinable physical or mental impairment of compa-
rable severity.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 208(5) (McKinney 1983). See also Callahan, supra note 13, at 427,
which suggests that two disinterested, competent physicians (the grantor's physician or
one selected by the trustee and another selected by the closest relative) should deter-
mine if a disability has occurred.
182. See infra text accompanying notes 215-17.
183. Because the New York regulations require that an applicant for medical assis-
tance seek all possible available resources (N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 352.23(a) (1982)),
the Department generally does not approve the application of a trust beneficiary before
such beneficiary, or someone in his behalf, seeks trust invasion.
184. Hoelzer v. Blum, 93 A.D.2d 605, 609, 462 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687 (2d Dep't 1983)
(citing Moffett v. Blum, 74 A.D.2d 625, 424 N.Y.S.2d 923 (2d Dep't 1980); Sherman v.
Sanfilippo, 74 A.D.2d 675, 424 N.Y.S.2d 540 (3d Dep't 1980)).
185. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 352.23(a) (1982).
186. Hoelzer v. Blum, 93 A.D.2d at 609, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
187. In re Estate of Escher, 94 Misc. 2d 952, 958, 407 N.Y.S.2d 106, 110 (Sur. Ct.
Bronx County 1978), aff'd sub nom. In re Gross, 75 A.D.2d 531, 426 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1st
Dep't), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 1006, 420 N.E.2d 91, 438 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1980) (citing In re Estate
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/10
ESTATE PLANNING
a strong public policy that programs funded by the government
were only for the destitute and, therefore, should not be used if
a trust fund was available. 8 8 Further, there was a presumption
that when one created a trust, under no circumstance would he
have wanted his testamentary beneficiary to become a burden
on a publicly funded program.""9
B. Recent Case Law
In 1978, in In re Estate of Escher, a0 a surrogate's court
took a new look at the welfare system and held that a trustee
had not abused her discretionary power when she refused to in-
vade the corpus to pay the bills of the life beneficiary.'91 The
Surrogate noted that public assistance programs have expanded
from classic "welfare" viewed as charity to numerous social in-
surance programs now looked upon as entitlements. 92 It appears
that New York courts will no longer require a trustee to invade a
trust for services the state is obligated to provide unless a clear
intent to do so can be discerned from the trust instrument.193
In a similar vein, the appellate division, in Hoelzer v.
Blum,'" recently held that where the trust remainderpersons
were not prepared to consent to invasion of the trust corpus for
the benefit of the income beneficiary, the courts were without
power under EPTL section 7-1.6(a) to convert the trust corpus
of Harold, 87 Misc. 2d 1001, 386 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1976) (where in the
absence of specific written consent of ultimate remainderman pursuant to N.Y. EST.
PowERs & TRuSTs LAW § 7-1.6(a), court denied application to invade trust principal al-
though it urged that testator would not have intended to require his spouse to resort to
public assistance and welfare aid with other funds available, and stressed that the bur-
den of care and support should not be shifted to the county except for emergency); In re
Estate of Marafioti, 80 Misc. 2d 206, 362 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sur. Ct. Monroe County 1974)
(where trust provided for income beneficiary to receive payments at stated ages, but no
express authority for the trustees to invade corpus for support and maintenance, court
directed invasion to the extent of $5000 each year for that purpose rather than to make
the beneficiary a public charge)).
188. In re Estate of Escher, 94 Misc. 2d at 958-59, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
189. Id. at 958, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
190. 94 Misc. 2d 952, 407 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1978) (Sur. Bertram
R. Gelfand).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 959, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
193. Estate of Coyne, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 5, 1982, at 6, col. 2 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County).
194. 93 A.D.2d 605, 462 N.Y.S.2d 684 (2d Dep't 1983).
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into an "available resource" of the income beneficiary for pur-
poses of determining the income beneficiary's eligibility for
Medicaid assistance. 19' EPTL section 7-1.6, which covers trusts
created on or before June 1, 1966, prohibits the courts from in-
vading the corpus for the maintenance, support, or education of
an income beneficiary, unless (1) such authorization is given in
the trust instrument, or (2) the needy income beneficiary will
ultimately be entitled to share in the trust corpus and all other
beneficiaries are adult and competent and consent in writing to
invasion of corpus. 1"
Where the trustees have refused to exercise a discretionary
power to invade principal, the courts will not interfere unless it
is shown that the trustees have abused their power.19 Thus, in
Hoelzer, where the testator had placed his daughter, disabled
from birth, in a nursing home and had provided for trust income
to be paid to the home with no additional authorization to use
corpus if trust income was insufficient for maintenance, the trust
could not be construed to mean that he intended the ongoing
care to include any emergency "sickness, accident or other un-
usual circumstances" for which he had provided for invasion."'
195. Id.
196. N.Y. EST. PowERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.6(a) (McKinney 1967). The subsection
provides:
Notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, the court having jurisdiction of an
express trust, heretofore created or declared, to receive the income from property
and apply it to the use of or pay it to any person, unless otherwise provided in the
disposing instrument, may in its discretion make an allowance from principal to
any income beneficiary whose support or education is not sufficiently provided for,
to the extent that such beneficiary is indefeasibly entitled to the principal of the
trust or any part thereof or, in case the income beneficiary is not entitled to the
principal of the trust or any part thereof, to the extent that all persons benefi-
cially interested in the trust are adult and competent and consent thereto in writ-
ing; provided that the court, after hearing on notice to all those beneficially inter-
ested in the trust in such manner as the court may direct, is satisfied that the
original purpose of the creator of the trust cannot be carried out and that such
allowance effectuates the intention of the creator.
Id.
197. See Hoelzer v. Blum, 93 A.D.2d at 612, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 689 (citing Oddo v.
Blum, 83 A.D.2d 868, 868, 442 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24 (2d Dep't 1981); In re Estate of Damon,
71 A.D.2d 916, 917, 419 N.Y.S.2d 742, 743 (2d Dep't 1979)).
198. Hoelzer v. Blum, 93 A.D.2d at 613, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 689. See also In re Estate
of Damon, 71 A.D.2d at 916, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 743 (where the trustees' discretionary
power to invade "in the event of critical illness, operation or need for operation or other
emergency" could not be stretched to provide for increased costs for routine care at an
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/10
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C. EPTL Section 7-1.6(b)
For trusts created after June 1, 1966, the courts have discre-
tion to utilize principal for an income beneficiary for whom sup-
port or education is insufficiently provided. 1" They may direct
invasion even if such beneficiary is not entitled to any princi-
pal.20 The courts, however, must first be satisfied that the origi-
nal purpose of the creator of the trust cannot be carried out
without invasion of principal and that such invasion effectuates
the creator's intent.20 1
1. Intent
The creator's intent is significant. For example, in In re Es-
tate of Ross, 02 a trust specified that it was not the testatrix'
intention to provide for the life beneficiary's support, but to give
her supplemental assistance. The Department of Social Services
stopped Medicaid payments to the nursing home, because re-
sources in the .trust exceeded the exempt amount.2 0s Despite the
trustees' unfettered discretionary power to invade corpus, the
court could not fault them for refusing to invade the corpus
when the Department stopped payments.0 4 The will expressly
required the trustees to consider the beneficiary's other sources
institution where the beneficiary had been a patient for 30 years).
199. Hoelzer v. Blum, 93 A.D.2d at 611, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 688. See also N.Y. EST.
Powuss & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.6(b) (McKinney 1967). The subsection provides:
Notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, the court having jurisdiction of an
express trust, hereafter created or declared, to receive income from property and
apply it to the use of or pay it to any person, unless otherwise provided in the
disposing instrument, may in its discretion make an allowance from principal to
any income beneficiary whose support or education is not sufficiently provided for,
whether or not such person is entitled to the principal of the trust or any part
thereof; provided that the court, after a hearing on notice to all those beneficially
interested in the trust in such manner as the court may direct, is satisfied that the
original purpose of the creator of the trust cannot be carried out and that such
allowance effectuates the intention of the creator.
Id.
200. Id. § 7-1.6(b).
201. Id.
202. 96 Misc. 2d 463, 409 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Sur. Ct. Yates County 1978).
203. Id. at 466, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
204. Id. at 468, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 202. See also Estate of Coyne, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 5,
1982, at 6, col. 2 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County).
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of support.2 5 The court construed this to include her statutory
entitlements to Medicaid assistance.2 °0
Intent was also considered important in Maul v. Fitzger-
ald20 7 where a testator had created a $5000 trust for the "proper
care, support and maintenance" of his mentally retarded son. 08
The court found that the testator, a physician, was fully aware
of his son's condition and familar with mental hygiene and social
services.209 Monthly expenses at the hospital far exceeded the
trust income and his son's meager income from Social Secur-
ity.2 10 Therefore, the court considered it inappropriate to pre-
sume that the testator would prefer trust invasion to having so-
ciety share the burden.2 " Since the testator, if living, would
have no obligation to support the beneficiary (who was over
twenty-one years of age), the court decided it was powerless to
impose this obligation on the testamentary trustee.1
In Moloshok v. Blum,2 1 3 a testamentary trust gave the trust-
ees absolute discretion to invade the corpus and, in addition,
provided that they "should not be held accountable to any court
or to any person for the exercise or non-exercise of this com-
pletely discretionary power."2" " The court concluded that the
trustee's refusal to invade could not be faulted and, therefore,
the corpus could not be considered available to the beneficiary
for Medicaid eligiblity purposes.21
2. Drafting considerations
Under New York law since In re Estate of Escher, trusts
can be drafted to enable the beneficiary to take advantage of
public assistance programs.2 6 The courts generally will not
question the trustee's non-exercise of his complete discretion
205. In re Estate of Ross, 96 Misc. 2d at 465, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
206. Id. at 468, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 203.
207. 78 A.D.2d 706, 432 N.Y.S.2d 282 (3d Dep't 1980).
208. Id. at 707, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
209. Id. at 708, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
210. Id. at 707, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
211. Id. at 708, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
212. Id. (citing In re Estate of Escher, 94 Misc. 2d at 960, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 111).
213. 109 Misc. 2d 660, 441 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1981).
214. Id. at 661, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
215. Id. at 661-62, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 332-33.
216. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
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unless there is obvious abuse.1 17 When providing the trustee
with such discretion, it would be expedient to specify that the
trustee shall look to other resources including entitlements and
that he shall not be held accountable to the court. If the trustee
is provided with absolute, unfettered discretion over trust in-
come and principal, the beneficiary will have no right to the
trust funds. Therefore, the Department of Social Services should
be unsuccessful in a court action to compel reimbursement for
services provided to the beneficiary.' s
IV. Conclusion
Public medical assistance, once considered welfare, is now
considered an entitlement. Effective estate planning is essential,
however, to qualify middle income clients for assistance.
For the client with inadequate insurance, such planning can
prevent his assets from being depleted by the spiraling costs of a
catastrophic illness or long term disability. He may convey a re-
mainder interest in his residence, retaining a life estate, or he
may create a fully discretionary, irrevocable sprinkling trust. So
long as such conveyances are not fraudulent, the Department of
Social Services will not be able to recoup from the recipient, or
his estate, medical benefits paid. Another approach may be for
the client to convey his assets in exchange for a private annuity.
Similarly, effective estate planning may enable an individual
to provide for a disabled beneficiary while preserving some of
the individual's assets for others. In New York, a disabled trust
beneficiary may now take advantage of public assistance without
first having to exhaust trust assets. The trustee may, in fact,
look to public entitlements before invading trust corpus.
It is imperative, therefore, that today's estate planner go be-
yond his traditional role of helping his clients minimize their es-
tate, gift, and income taxes. He must also explore all legitimate
217. Hoelzer v. Blum, 93 A.D.2d at 612, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 689 (citing Oddo v. Blum,
83 A.D.2d 868, 442 N.Y.S.2d 23 (2d Dep't 1981); In re Estate of Damon, 71 A.D.2d 916,
419 N.Y.S.2d 742 (2d Dep't 1979)).
218. Unlike the fully discretionary grantor trust (see supra note 137), the present
and future creditors of a third party beneficiary cannot successfully claim that the trust
was created to perpetrate a fraud.
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approaches to qualify his clients for public entitlements, while
preserving their assets for distribution to chosen beneficiaries.
Susan T. Baer
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/10
